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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Entrepreneurship plays a dynamic role in the 
country’s economic activity, and accurate 
information about new business development 
and sustainability is essential to establishing 
public and private programs that encourage new 
business development”  
(Kauffman Firm Foundation, 2008) 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Research Background 
The dissertation studies the inward licensing phenomenon within the context of new ventures. The 
research idea stems from the following considerations. 
As the traditional in-house R&D models have been replaced for Open Innovation paradigm 
(Chesbrough, 2003), thus for more collaborative and less integrated means through which manage 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Laursen and Salter, 2006), the rate, at which markets for technology 
grow, has dramatically increased (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012). Markets for technology are defined as 
“virtual spaces where innovations are exchanged in the form of intellectual property rights, 
products and services”(Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001). The new model of open innovation 
requires firms to leverage on external technologies and on external sources in order to feed their 
innovation capacity and to unlock their internal R&D ability. In a context of knowledge transactions 
and exchange, licensing deals are acknowledged as one of the main tools chosen by firms to trade 
know-how and technologies (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Arora & Gambardella, 2010). Accordingly, 
licensing can be described as an arm’s length contractual deal, used by firms in order to trade know-
how and intellectual property (IP) rights (Arora, 1995). As the innovation strategy of firms 
increasingly shifted to open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) and firms actively transfer technology 
to other organizations (Lichtenthaler, 2007), the reliance on inward technology licensing became 
relevant. 
Over the past twenty years, the number of inter-firm licensing agreements has grown faster (Arora 
& Gambardella, 2010). Streams of research (Gu and Lev, 2004, Arora et al., 2001a, Arora and 
Fosfuri,2003, Vonortas, 2003 and Kim and Vonortas,2006) suggest that licensing is the most used 
channel for the transfer of technological knowledge among firms, in particular in in high-tech 
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industries. Thus, to gain an empirical understanding of the extent of the explosion in licensing 
activity, we quote a recent World Bank Survey. It states that “global royalty and licensing fees have 
increased at a rate of 81% over the last two decades” (World Bank report, 2012).  
What is even more interesting about the stunning rates of licensing activities are the managerial 
implications of this trend. Since licensing is becoming a diffused practice in almost every industry, 
firms started perceiving licensing as an integral part of their business strategy, as a choice to be 
taken into consideration for their technology strategies. In other words, firms have adopted a new 
attitude towards licensing: strategic, and no longer, tactical attitude (Litchtenthaler, 2007). 
Licensing has shifted from an exclusive tool to a pivotal part of business development, of strategic 
planning and branding. The management of licensing deals, and more broadly of intellectual 
property, has evolved from a task involving only the legal office to a task involving several business 
units. Indeed, the role of legal office is to protect company’s intellectual properties, in every forms: 
patents, trademarks and copyrights. The firm’s business units view the legal right, object of 
intellectual property, in different ways according to their aims: for the technology office an 
intellectual property leads to the development of new products. This view is shared by the sale 
division and by marketing functions that consider intellectual property as a tool to gain and sustain 
an advantage over firm’s competitors. As a consequence, until recently companies not  limited their 
licensing activities to technologies away from their core business, but they start license also core 
technologies to firms that were not direct competitors. Although knowledge outsourcing  cannot 
completely replace firms’ internal research and development (R&D), licensing can be used as a 
complementary part of firms’ overall innovation efforts (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). The 
strengths of this strategy have already been supported continued growth, reduced time to market 
and created an innovation process that is successful overall. Licensing provides greater strategic 
flexibility and a larger number of feasible options for novel combinations as compared to solely in-
house alternatives (Laursen, Leone, & Torrisi, 2010).  
Despite the empirical evidence that the importance of licensing has substantially increased, the 
researchers have emphasized almost exclusively the supply-side of markets for technology, putting 
research efforts on the incentives and motives behind firms’ decisions to trade their technologies 
(e.g., Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986), overlooking the demand-side of technology transfer, the 
role of licensees. 
We follow this recent trend on licensee’s perspective, transferring the analysis of licensing-in 
phenomenon within the scenario of new ventures. In other words, our analysis aims at investigating 
the characteristics and the potential consequences that a new venture has, when it is involved in a 
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licensing agreement as licensee. Liabilities of newness and smallness, experiential constraints, 
limited resources, several  shortages, rapid technological obsolescence, dynamic environments, 
continuously changing market conditions, the need to complement and augment in-house activities, 
still at an embryonic stage, the need to keep up with a rapid rate of technological change and 
compete by creating innovative products, are factors that  foster new ventures to license other 
companies’ technologies (Zahra, 2005). While the benefits and the downsides of inward licensing 
phenomenon implemented by an established firms have already been investigated, an important 
issue  still remains open: is a licensing-in strategy a winning choice for a new venture?   
 
 
1.1.2 Overall aim of the thesis 
The original idea of my thesis draws on interrelated assumptions: 1) among the tools used, in the 
markets for technology, for the acquisition of external knowledge, the licensing agreements are 
acknowledged as one of the most important contractual mechanisms (Anand & Khanna, 2000); 2) 
the liabilities of newness and the liabilities of smallness force new venture to strongly rely on  
external knowledge sources. Albeit the relevance of this topic, little attention has been paid so far to 
its investigation, especially in the licensing context; 3) nowadays there is an increasing trend in 
licensing practices, but the literature on markets for technology focuses almost exclusively on the 
incentives and rationales that foster  firms’ decisions to trade their technologies (Gans & Stern, 
2003; Teece, 1986), under-investigating the role of the acquiring firm, the licensee, overlooking the 
demand side of the market.  
Therefore, as already stated, the thesis investigates the inward licensing phenomenon within the 
context of new ventures.  
The licensing-in decision entails the search, acquisition, integration, assimilation, exploitation of 
external technologies and the subsequent learning from them. Therefore, the main questions that 
new venture licensee has to address if it decides to undertake an inward licensing strategy, can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Is convenient for a new venture to choose, as initial technology strategy, the 
implementation of an inward licensing ?  
2) Does this decision affect its survival probabilities?  
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3) Does the age, at which a new venture becomes a licensee, affect its innovative 
capabilities? Is it better to undertake a licensing-in strategy soon after founding or to 
postpone this strategy until the new venture has accumulated significant resources? 
Hence, the analysis is mainly focused on the effects of the implementation of an inward licensing 
strategy on survival probabilities and on innovation performance. We choose to investigate the new 
venture’s decision to acquire external knowledge, through a licensing deal, in the founding years, 
because we support the literature (Bamford et al., 1999; Aspelund et al., 2005) according to which 
early decisions have persistent effect and shape the firm’s subsequent behaviors in the medium and 
long-term. We address such research questions using data from a sample of 4,928 US new ventures 
based on the survey conducted by the Kauffman Firm Survey, as explained in more detail in the 
next section.  
In sum, this research project aims at disentangling the concept of inward licensing in the new 
ventures’ context, at enriching our understanding of the variables that compose a new venture’s 
boundaries and a new venture’s technology strategy. We would like to contribute to the licensing 
literature, exploring the extent to which licensee firms may learn from licensed technologies. 
Moreover, we could contribute to new ventures growth literature by adding factors that are 
responsible for new born firms’ success or failure. Understanding what influences profitability and 
growth of new high-technology ventures is of policy interest because of the role such firms play in 
economic dynamics. Moreover, we could give our contribution to the literature about the resource 
accumulation in new ventures. A major challenge for entrepreneurs is to decide how best to 
accumulate resources required for exploiting their opportunity. Early resource choices have 
significant impact on survival and growth of new ventures (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Exploring 
the consequences of choosing an inward licensing strategy as a tool to increment initial resource 
stock in the founding year is a trigger issues. 
 
 
1.1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as a collection of three papers. Each of them provides different insights of 
the same phenomenon - technology in-licensing within the context of new ventures – inserted in 
different theoretical frameworks of reference. With the exception of the first paper, that only 
provides descriptive analysis on the characteristics that distinguish a new venture licensee from a 
new venture non-licensee, they share the same methodology of analysis - regression analysis on 
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confidential data gained by the Kauffman Firm Foundation. However, the two empirical papers 
employ different econometric model specification according to their research questions.  
The first paper, “New Venture’s Inward Licensing: Who and What?”, presents a general 
overview on the role of technology licensing in the markets for technology, providing empirical 
evidence of the intensity of licensing, its evolution, the characteristics, motivations and obstacles 
met by companies doing or willing to license (Zuniga and Guellec, 2009; Radauer and Dudenbostel, 
2013). Since a license agreement involves two parties, the licensor who supplies the technology and 
the licensee who gets permission to use this technology, both the licensing-out and the licensing-in 
activities are wide spreading. Therefore, the researchers have been called for a deeper 
understanding of the demand-side of licensing agreements. (Arora et al., 2001; Cesaroni, 2004; Tsai 
and Wang, 2007; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Leone and Reichstein, 2012; Wang and Li-Ying, 
2012). We attempt to accommodate the recent trend on licensee’s perspective, providing further 
insights into the new ventures literature. Although literature, stressing the positive contributions of 
developing innovation with collaboration of external partners
1
, proposes that especially new and 
small firms rarely have the resources and capabilities necessary to respond to the innovation 
demands (Yli-Renko et al., 2001), few studies have investigated the inward licensing phenomenon 
in the new venture context. We examine the characteristics of  new ventures that decide to 
implement an in-licensing strategy.  
In developing this research project, we rely on the comprehensive Kauffman Firm Database. The 
KFS is the largest longitudinal panel with an initial sample of 4.928 US firms that began operations 
in 2004, surveyed annually from 2004 to 2011.We will exhibit some descriptive statistics based on 
this sample, in order to highlight the characteristics of licensee new ventures as compared to the rest 
of the sample (for instance in terms of size, industry, financing method, firm’s origin). We do 
believe this is a necessary step in order to have a clearer understanding of the licensing-in 
phenomenon in the case of new ventures.  
Our main findings are the following: 
 The new ventures licensees come from the manufacturing industry, while their counterparts 
come from the from the professional, scientific, and technical services.  
 The new ventures licensees are usually smaller than their counterparts.  
                                                          
1
 From the perspective of learning and innovation (Tsai et al., 2007), inward technology licensing is a particular type of 
external technology acquisition 
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 An higher number of new ventures licensees, compared to non-licensees, born as a purchase 
of franchise. 
 The new ventures that make use of inward licensing are products- providers.  
 Licensees have constantly higher level of debt and equity.  
 New ventures that decide to be involved in a licensing agreement as licensee are products 
provider rather than services provider.  
 The number of new ventures that in-license copyrights and trademarks is higher than those 
new ventures that in-license patents. 
This study has an exploratory approach, therefore its limitations are straightforward. Future 
researches should assess in a more systematic and robust way the antecedents of the licensing-in 
choice, using more sophisticated econometric approaches.  One of them could start from the most 
counterintuitive finding emerged from our analysis:  new ventures are more likely to license-in 
copyrights and trademarks rather than a patent. Accordingly, first,  future researches should be 
focused on a deep investigation of the rationale that makes a new venture more willing to acquire a 
copyright or a trademark, through a licensing agreement, rather than a patent. Second, since the 
database on which we work is entirely made of firms born in United States, it should be helpful to 
work out  a study, similar to the one we are describing, but considering differences across countries. 
Third, the analysis could be completed by taking into account information about the tools by which 
licensors get in touch with licensees. This point is, according to us, relevant because the search of 
the right partner is a long and time-consuming process that for a new is even more challenging than 
for an established firm.. Fourth, the information about licensing deals at our disposal are exclusively 
linked to the probability that a new venture becomes a licensee or not. It would be more stimulating 
enrich the base of data adding details about the characteristics of the technologies exchanged and 
the commercial terms of the transactions.  
In sum, this first paper has to be considered in light of some limitations and  patterns on which 
develop future researches, but it still provides a rich insight into the specificities of new ventures 
adopting a licensing-in strategy. For this reason, the present study facilitates the interpretation of the 
results of the next empirical papers. A major outcome, indeed, regards the difficulty of directly 
comparing licensee vs non-licensee startups, given the presence of systematic differences between 
the two groups. This suggests the importance of adopting more sophisticated matching techniques, 
such as propensity score methods, in the analyses of the two groups. This is exactly the approach 
we will follow in our next chapter related to the survival chances of licensee firms. 
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The second and third papers focus on empirical issues.  
The second paper, “Effect Of Inward Licensing On New Venture’s Survival”, deals with the 
impact of inward licensing on new born firm’s survival probabilities.  
The several shortages deriving from the liabilities of newness and the liabilities of youngness, that 
characterize a newly established firm,  constrain a new venture to strongly rely on external sources, 
in order to overcome those shortages. In spite of the relevance of this topic, the impact of external 
acquisition on new born firm’s longevity has not been investigated yet, especially in the licensing 
context. Based on arguments mainly from the resource based view theory and the literature on the 
relevance of initial conditions, we advance an hypothesis centered on a negative relationship 
between the decision of a new venture to be a licensee in its founding year and its likelihood to 
survive. This hypothesis is corroborated by the multinomial logit survival analysis: a new born firm, 
that chooses, as initial technology strategy, to acquire knowledge externally developed through a 
licensing agreement, has lower probability to survive than its non-licensees counterparts, as result 
of longer speed to market process.  
Using the confidential version of panel data from the Kauffman Firm Survey, through propensity 
score matching procedure, we create a database of 260 new ventures, 130 licensees in their 
founding year and 130 non-licensees. Therefore, we compare the survival rate of  a sample of 130  
new ventures that decide to apply an inward licensing strategy in its first year of existence and the 
survival rate of a control group of 130  new ventures that, in its first year of existence, do not 
acquire external knowledge through a licensing agreement. We choose to analyze the 
implementation of this strategy exclusively in founding year because, embracing the (Bamford et 
al., 1999; Aspelund et al., 2005), we stand by the belief that early decisions adhere with the 
organization and engrave the firm in the long term. The results from our regression analyses show 
that the new ventures that decide to acquire a knowledge asset, externally developed, in its first year 
of existence runs the risk to be slower in reaching the market than a new venture that is not a 
licensee in early stage of its development. The higher the number of years until the first sale, could 
be one of the main cause for the lower survival probabilities.  
This article contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it addresses the inward licensing 
phenomenon in the context of new ventures, assessing whether it enables the licensees to have a 
higher or lower probabilities of survival than non-licensees. Therefore, the present study advances 
the discussion on the role of  inward licensing  from a new venture’s viewpoint. Second, while prior 
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researches have mainly focused their attention to the investigation of the effect of owner 
characteristics and capabilities, grouped into the categories of human, social, and financial, on the 
likelihood of firm survival., this study adds a reason why a new venture is forces to stop its 
operation, a wrong initial technology strategy. Third, since we have chosen to  evaluate the impact 
of an inward licensing strategy, applied in the first years of existence, on new venture’s survival 
probabilities, our study could supplement existing literature on the effects of new venture founding 
conditions. Fourth, the present study contributes to the markets for technology literature: the 
literature on markets for technology has not determined whether in-licensing is a winning strategy 
for new ventures. 
The paper has limitations related mainly to the nature of licensing agreements and patents. Due to 
the lack of data relatively to each licensing agreement and to the attributes of the parts involved in 
the agreement, we cannot control for the similarities or differences in the two parties’ current 
knowledge base. In developing the present article, we have investigated exclusively on a single tool 
through which acquire external developed knowledge, the inward licensing, but the impact of other 
channels, different from licensing agreement, on survival could be an interesting issue to be 
analysed. Moreover, our approach centres its attention  on inward licensing in one period of time 
and this remains a severe limitation of the study. However, with future researches, it will be 
possible to examine whether the being a licensee, not only in the founding year, changes over time 
its impact on survival rates.  
 
Finally, in the third article,  
“A Study Of The Influence Of Learning Sequences On New Venture’s Innovation: The 
Moderating Effect Of Founder’s Experience”, we employ the capabilities literature and the 
organizational learning literature to shed light on implications of learning sequences adopted by 
new ventures on their innovative performance. Our focus is on the effect exerted by age at which a 
firm starts learning, following an indirect pattern, on its ability to be innovative.  In particular, we 
investigate the impact of two alternative initial learning paths: direct-indirect and indirect-direct 
learning respectively. Consistent with Schwab (2007),  direct learning entails that a firm learns from 
its own background, while some indirect learning implies learning from others’ course of actions 
(Ingram, 2002). In particular, the most investigated processes through which direct learning takes 
place are trial and error, experimental learning and improvisational learning, while the most 
investigated process through which indirect learning takes place is the vicarious learning, which 
occurs as firms observe actions implemented by other firms and then change their own behaviour 
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consequently (Haunschild and Miner, 1997). In vicarious knowledge acquisition, firms learn from 
the experience of others, by observing them in networks, or through licensing, strategic alliances or 
strategies of collaboration (Fletcher and Harris, 2012). The case we analyse in this study is 
vicarious learning through licensing.We postulate that the timing at which a firm chooses to start 
learning indirectly impacts on its innovative outcomes. Consistent with Fletcher and Harris (2012), 
we choose, as tool trough which firms learn indirectly, the inward licensing strategy. Based on 
Kauffman Firm Foundation Enclave Database, we find that the new ventures that decide to rely 
later on the indirect learning process exhibit a better innovative performance than the new ventures 
that decide to learn indirectly in the first years of existence. This relationship is negatively 
moderated by prior entrepreneurial experience, in terms of industry and start-up experience. We 
will try to demonstrate whether and how the age at which a firm decides to rely on indirect learning 
approach has an impact on its capacity to be innovative. In order to achieve our objective, we 
analyse a sample composed by 276 new ventures, extracted from the 4,928 firms included in the 
Kauffman Firm Database. Among them, 140 follow the indirect-direct learning path and 136 follow 
the direct-indirect learning path. Rephrasing in light of timing at which the indirect learning starts,  
140 new ventures decide to start learning indirectly in first two years of their existence  applying an 
inward licensing strategy and they are labelled as “early indirect learners”,  while 136 start rely on 
indirect learning approach, implemented an inward licensing strategy some years after their 
founding and they are labelled as “late indirect learners”. We measure the innovation output of the 
new ventures using information on patent filings and new product introduction included in the 
Kauffman Firm Foundation Enclave Database. The results of our regression analyses show that new 
ventures that decide to rely later on the indirect learning process exhibit a better innovative 
performance than the new ventures that decide to learn indirectly in the first years of existence. This 
relationship is negatively moderated by prior founder’s entrepreneurial experience, in terms of 
industry experience and start-up experience.  
We find that being a late indirect learner is positively associated with an increase in firm patenting 
activity in the years subsequent to the licensing deal. That is to say, late indirect learners have 
higher probabilities to introduce innovation than early indirect learners. Indeed, firms that start their 
own operations in an autonomous way, relying on experiential and direct learning, build a better 
articulated system of internal capabilities and better developed “learning by doing” process. In so 
doing, a new venture avoids the risk of casual ambiguity and partial learning.  
Given that the aim of the study is to make evidence of the importance of learning sequences, and 
specifically of the impact of initial learning sequences, on firms’ innovation outputs, the main 
contribution of the present study is revealing whether there are convenient learning sequences and 
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how they differentially influence firm’s innovative implications. Therefore, we would like to enrich 
the recent stream of research on “learning sequences” (Bingham et al., 2012) and the  organizational 
learning literature within the context of new ventures. Related to the organizational learning 
literature, our findings challenge the “learning advantages of newness” thesis Autio, Sapienza, and 
Almeida,2000). While it suggests that the earlier the firm is committed in international activity, the 
higher the degree of success of its learning efforts, we find that, even if  our framework is not 
applied in an international entrepreneurship framework, the older a new venture, the faster in 
learning and developing innovation. Moreover, since we choose to analyse the inward licensing 
strategy as a process through which follow an indirect learning pattern, we could also contribute to 
the licensing literature, investigating the role of new venture as licensee. We add novel insights on 
learning-by licensing as a relatively unexplored area in the  literature on entrepreneurial firms. The 
literature stream on the demand side of markets for technology has largely ignored the fact that 
firms can use technology licensing-in as a learning mechanism connected to their overall innovation 
strategy. Therefore, this present study could fill this gap and contribute to the technology licensing 
research stream (Arora et al., 2001; Fosfuri, 2006; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
The main limitations of the present study are mainly related to the need to examine learning 
sequences in a larger number of firms,  within a wider range of industries, and to the variable used 
as indicator of innovation performance. We measure the firm’s innovative capability relying on the 
raw count of patents, but other measures could be performed. 
 
Each paper stands as a single independent chapter of the thesis. However, in order to get introduced 
in the flow of though, the theoretical section comes first. A general overview of licensing literature 
is provided with the aim of identifying the research questions and to highlight the relevance of using 
the selected theoretical framework to investigate the same phenomenon from different angles. The 
three research papers are then developed in the subsequent chapters. 
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
This section aims at providing a general review of the literature on the licensing topic.  
Given that each of  the three papers, of which the thesis is composed,  provide a  distinct insights of 
the licensing phenomenon, analysing it from different angles and from different theoretical 
frameworks of reference, the current section is not processed in order to provide a comprehensive 
and exhaustive review of the topic we are investigating, the licensing. 
 
1.2.1 The relevance of inward licensing strategy 
This research project aims primarily at investigating the impacts of inward licensing strategy in the 
scenario of newly established firms. Specifically, attention has been paid to the effect that a 
licensing-in strategy exerts on survival performance and innovation outcomes. To achieve this 
objective, we proceed examining the consequences that the implementation of a licensing-in 
strategy, at a particular point in time, has on new venture’s performance in terms of survival rate 
and innovative outcomes. 
The relevance of the phenomenon is twofold: theoretical (1) and empirical (2). 
(1) The constantly increasing rate of licensing practices has stimulated the interest of literature  and 
boosted research production on this topic over the last few decades (Bessy, 2002). The growing 
trend in the licensing activities has addressed scholars’ efforts on both economic and strategic 
determinants underpinning this pattern. In the theoretical investigations, the licensor’s dilemma  
(Fosfuri, 2006), that consist in choosing whether to license out technologies or exploit them for 
internal activities, has been over-investigated, while exclusively a small number of previous studies 
have inspected the licensing phenomenon from the licensee’s point of view (Atuahene-Gima, 1993; 
Atuahene-Gima and Patterson, 1993; Lowe and Taylor, 1998). Since a license agreement involves 
two parties, the licensor who supplies the technology and the licensee who gets permission to use 
this technology, both the licensing-out and the licensing-in activities are wide spreading. A survey 
of organizations in OECD countries (2004) verifies that both established and new firms have 
intensified their propensity to license-in and to license-out technologies. Nearly 60% of 
interviewers pointed out that they had direct experienced of a spread in both inward and outward 
patent licensing over the past years, and more than 70% foresaw inward licensing to enlarge further 
in the next 5 years. To gain a more complete understanding of the dynamics underlying the 
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licensing phenomenon, is imperative for researchers to take into account the demand side of 
licensing deals as well (Arora et al., 2001; Cesaroni, 2004; Tsai and Wang, 2007; Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010; Leone and Reichstein, 2012; Wang and Li-Ying, 2012) Even though, in the last 
years, scholars are shifting their attention to the investigation of licensee’s role, the new venture as 
licensee is still an open issue to be explored (Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Zahra et al., 2005; Tsai et al., 
2008). We would like to contribute to this recent trend on licensee’s perspective, providing further 
insights into the new ventures literature, considering new venture as a licensee. 
(2) Empirical evidence demonstrates that licensing agreements are becoming a well-established 
business tool and a diffused practice in every industry. Arora and Gambardella (2010) report some 
empirical data to demonstrate the increasing licensing activity: of the European firms interviewed 
and involved in licensing activities in 2006, approximately 45% showed a raise in revenues deriving 
from licensing or the number of licensing deals in which they are committed, although only 8% 
registered a substantial increase in either. Only 3% of the firms reported a decrease, with most 
(slightly more than 50%) indicating no change. Robbins (2006) appraises that technology licensing 
alone valued as much as $60 billion of receipts by US corporations in 2002, and Athreye and 
Cantwell’s (2007) analysis of World Bank data suggests substantial growth in international 
licensing. There is an increasing number of firms that perceive technology licensing as a 
fundamental part of firms’ business strategy, as an integrated part of a longer term plan, that 
involves not only peripheral activities but also core business activities. As proof of this, we 
highlight some meaningful sentences reported from the survey conducted by Litchtenthaler in 2012. 
“Licensing is not always an either-or decision. . . it often goes along with product innovation” 
(R&D manager, chemical firm). - “Basically, we have no choice. . . we have to cross-license 
technology to keep our competitive position in the product markets” (Innovation manager, 
electronics firm). - “Without cross-licensing many of our technologies, we could not successfully 
develop our products because our operating freedom would be strictly limited” (Head of R&D, 
semiconductors firm). - “The implementation of our licensing and cross-licensing agreements is 
critical for new product performance. . . and we often face problems that arise in transferring 
technology” (Head of R&D, electronics firm). - “Technology licensing is not a stand-alone activity. 
. . we strongly profit from related product development expertise” (Marketing manager, machinery 
firm). -“Without internally developing a product prototype, we would not have been able to license 
this technology” (Business development manager, automotive firm). 
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- “Our licensing revenues cover more than the costs of the licensing activities. . . the indirect 
benefits on product innovation may be even larger, but they are difficult to calculate” (R&D 
manager, chemical firm). - “One of our competitors achieves higher profits by closely coordinating 
product development and licensing” (Innovation manager, electronics firm). 
In addition to those assessments, we report two examples from the pharmaceutical sector, in order 
to highlight the stunning rate at which licensing activities are expanding and their relevant 
importance for successful innovative outputs. Regarding to a technology recently licensed to 
develop drugs at the preclinical stage, the CEO of Iris Pharma affirms: “Using this new device into 
our preclinical models will improve them greatly. We will be able for example to assess many other 
endpoints […]”. Reporting another example, the executive director of process science at Boehringer 
Ingelheim states that "We will be able to leverage BaroFold's high pressure refold technology on a 
variety of proteins under development […]”. Those descriptions suggest that licensing-in is used by 
firms to gain access up to the minute technologies and advance in an efficient way their innovative 
capacities (Atuahene-Gima, 1993; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
Licensing activities are wide spreading not only between different companies, but also between 
different continents, as suggested and demonstrated in a recent report, Patev (2013). The world’s 
biggest license payer is Ireland, at US$38 billion a year. This data is the result of the special tax 
arrangements between Ireland and other countries. The biggest contributor in terms of licensing 
payments are East Asia and the Pacific region, followed by Europe. At the top of the rank of 
receiver of licence fees we find North America, with US$109 billion for year. According to a 
survey conducted in 2007 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
European Patent Office and the University of Tokyo, Asian companies are more likely to take an 
active role in markets for technology, selling and buying their technologies, than European 
companies. Rephrasing this finding in mathematical terms, only the 31% of European firms are 
prone to share their intellectual properties compared to the 74% if Japanese companies that are used 
to deal with licensing agreements.  This result reflects the extent to which the ‘not-invented-here’ 
syndrome is boundless in Europe. 
Out of 3779 inter-firm agreements, from 1995 to 2012, reported by the SDC Platinum database, 
1362 are licensing agreement among established and new firms. The increasing use of inward 
licensing among new-born ventures is demonstrated by data provided by Kauffman Foundation. On 
4.928 new businesses founded in 2004, 493 implement an inward licensing strategy in their 
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founding year, of which 135 acquire from external sources patents, 177 copyright and 
181trademarks. All of this seems to suggest that the determinants and the effects of inward licensing 
on new venture’s innovative and economic performance is a worthwhile issue for research. 
1.2.2 Literature review 
The literature has tended to separate analysis of the determinants, rationales according to which 
firms choose to license-out and license-in technology (Arora and Gambardella, 2010). We follow 
this division here. Studies on licensing activities and practices proliferated since the 1980s. 
The propensity to licensing-out technologies is the most studied topic in the licensing literature. 
Several authors have provided insights on the factors affecting the likelihood of licensing-out 
decisions. Our starting point is the analysis of the rationales underlying the decision to licensing-
out, placing ourselves from the licensor’s perspective. 
In trying to understand the determinants of the licensing strategy, we highlight some general 
characteristics of licensors. Gallini (1984:931) stated that “in contrast to previous model in which 
R&D activity deters entry into the product market, firms are encouraged into the product market – 
via licensing – as a way of deterring them from R&D activity”. To wit, the author affirmed that an 
incumbent firm has two alternative strategic choices in order to maintain its dominant position, 
gaining an advantage over its rivals, and to avoid that new entrants erode its market shares: 1) to 
create barriers to potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its 
rivals (Gallini, 1984; Kats and Shapiro, 1987), exploiting the benefits of a first mover advantages; 
2) to license its old technology to its competitors before they commit their internal R&D activities 
toward a new technology. In both cases, the driving forces to license-out correspond to the 
licensor’s willingness to reduce the threat of new entrants and to prevent the potential depletion of 
its firm’s market position by its competitor’s discovery of a better technology. This strategic 
incentive to license-out reduces licensee’s forces to develop internal R&D capabilities. 
An alternative motivation would be to license innovation to rivals in order to expand the scale of 
use of the new technology. Moreover, by licensing their rivals, incumbent firm could achieve a 
fundamental outcome: the establishment of its technology as a de-facto standard (Arora et al., 
2001), allowing to build reputation and reinforce customer’s commitment. By contrast, an economic 
incentive for licensor derives from rents in the form of royalties from licensing. Thus, while 
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strategic incentive could significantly discourage R&D investments, by hindering the technological 
progress in the long-run, economic incentives, instead, could enhance it, by empowering the 
innovation race among competitors. 
In case of licensing agreement, bargaining firms could face the double-side moral hazard problem 
(Arora et al., 2001). It is so called because it refers to the fact the both licensor and licensee have 
some incentives to behave opportunistically in agreeing on know-how clauses. 
On one hand, licensor may license its technology without providing the required know-how to 
exploit it, on the other hand, licensee, given the possibility of moral hazard on its counterpart, will 
make the payments after being convinces that the whole technology, as well as the tacit part, has 
been transmitted. In 2011, Gordanier and Miao posited that the transfer of knowledge is 
unchangeable: as soon as obtained, it is intricate for the innovator to retreat the knowledge from a 
licensee (Caves et al., 1983). This corresponds to say that a licensee may be able to make an 
efficient use of a licensed asset even after the license has expired. Conceptually, if we think of a 
technology as embodying both tangible assets and intangible know-how, we can conclude that the 
expire of a license contract may cease the use of tangible assets by past licensees, but it is 
impossible to prevent licensees from utilizing the learnt technological know-how. The authors label 
this phenomenon as “technology leakage”. It represents a potential drawback for short-term 
licensing contracts. 
Consistent with Teece’s seminal work (1986) in which it is argued that licensing propensity 
increases if the innovator could benefit from strong patent protection, Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) 
stated that “the propensity of licensing-out technologies depends on the interplay between the 
appropriability regime and the presence of complementary assets”. Arora and Fosfuri (2003) 
elaborate a framework in order to understand the rationales that encourage firms to sell their 
technology, and the extent to which external market conditions, in particular product market and 
technology market competition, influence this decision. In selecting whether to license or not, the 
licensor has to place in equilibrium the amount of revenue earned from licensing and the rent-
dissipation effect produced as a consequence of the higher level of product-market competition, 
produced by the licensing agreement. As a result, factors that enhance licensing revenue or that 
reduce rent dissipation will encourage licensing. 
The licensor’s reputation of being a reliable and guaranteed technology provider (Litchtenthaler and 
Ernst, 2007), the stock of technological knowledge of the provider, the company’s prior expeience 
with licensing, the strength of IPR protection, and the nature of the technology and thus the 
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fragmentation of downstream markets (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2007) are found to be 
important stimuli for the propensity to sell technology through licensing agreements (Kim and 
Vonortas, 2006). 
To sum up, if we adopt the licensor’s perspective, we can label the majority of researches in 2 
categories: 
1) Determinants of propensity to license out (Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Kim and Vonortas, 2006; 
Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 2006; Lichtenthaler 2007; Motoahshi et al., 2008; Grimpe and 
Hussinger, 2011) 
2) Optimal form of licensing contracts and payment scheme (Bessy et al., 2002; Dutu and Julien, 
2007; Gordanier and Miao, 2011) 
Despite the fact that at each licensor corresponds a licensee that chose to in-license external 
technologies for financial motives that could be to escape from the R&D risks, or strategic motives 
that could be gain access to technologies otherwise not developable in-house, licensing decision of 
the licensee has been under-investigated (Atuahene-Gima and Patterson,1993). Since little 
examination has been dedicated to the investigation of licensee’s perspective, some academics 
(Caves et al., 1983; Atuahene-Gima, 1992, 1993; Atuahene-Gima and Patterson, 1993; Lowe and 
Taylor, 1998; Arora et al., 2001; Cesaroni, 2004) began to put the emphasis on the necessity to take 
into account also the demand side of technology transfers. In 1979, Parry and Waston examined the 
characteristics of 67 firms that had licensed-in technology from unaffiliated firms. They found a 
positive relationship between the extent of inward licensing and firm size, R&D expenditure, and 
number of R&D personnel. 
Caves, Crookell and Killing (1983), in their “The Imperfect market for technology Licenses”, 
provided the first empirical investigation of the fact that much less is known about the licensee 
compared to what is known about the licensor. The authors analyzed the determinants of 
imperfection that characterize licensing deals. 
Analyzing these imperfections, it is possible to derive different classes of behavioral predictions 
(Caves et al., 1983), to determine the circumstances under which it results convenient license-out, 
the circumstances under which potential licensees will enter such contracts. 
Their findings suggested that the obvious advantage that licensee has to enter licensing agreement is 
to “secure technology at a cost lower than by developing it afresh” (Caves et al, 1983; 265). 
However, their work suggested that licensing-in may be acknowledged as a tool to attain a 
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privileged channel to technologies according to firms’ diversification strategy in which they make 
use of other already usable assets. 
Some years after, Cesaroni (2004) demonstrated, in the following assessment, its willingness to take 
the opposite perspective, usually taken  by other scholars, in studying the influence of market for 
technology on firm’s corporate strategy: “Scholars have mostly explored the supply side of markets 
for technology. In this study we take the opposite perspective” (Ibidem, 2004: 1547). His findings 
can be stated as follow: the more easily technologies can be traded on the markets, the higher the 
probability that internal technological constraints that prevent firm from entering into new product 
markets can be overcome. 
Some other works have provided theoretical and empirical useful insights on the licensing decision 
of the licensee firm. They investigate different motives and incentives associated to the licensee’s 
behavior. Atuehene-Gima (1992, 1993) investigated some factors affecting the firm’s intention or 
propensity to adopt a technological inward licensing strategy. Those factors are labeled into four 
groups: firm’s characteristics, management characteristics, benefits and costs of inward technology 
licensing and external factors. Based on four items (the more or less high degree of urgency of the 
need to license-in; the propensity the firm will in-license in the coming two years; the probability 
that the licensee will penetrate new markets with new product; the possibility that licensee will 
enlarge their current product portfolio by licensing rather than by relying on internal development), 
the inclination to implement an inward technology licensing referred to the firm´s aptitude towards 
inward technology licensing. Amongst other, the most stimulating finding he highlighted was about 
the effect exerted by the lack of internal new product development capabilities, by the satisfactory 
inward technology licensing experience‖ and by the felt benefits of the inward technology licensing 
on firms’ propensity to adopt inward technology licensing. Specifically, the lowest the level of their 
capabilities, the higher the level of perceived benefits from the license and the higher the 
satisfaction tied with the previous licensing experience, the higher the firm’s propensity to license-
in. 
Following the same logic, Athuene-Gima and Patterson (1993) dedicated their attention to the 
examination of individual-level factors, and in particular on the perceptions of managers in their 
decisions to license technology from independent organizations according to their new product 
development strategy. The main objective of their work was to understand which benefits, costs and 
risks are involved and which ones have the greatest impact on the firm’s decision to license. The 
study revealed that firms use licensing to acquire new products mainly to meet the more immediate 
need to gain competitive advantage in the short run rather than having access to future technology. 
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Lowe and Taylor (1998) found that the two strategies, involved in the licensor’s dilemma of 
developing internal R&D or technology acquisition strategy decision, are complementary rather 
than substitute. Therefore, the use of licensing requires complementary assets to be already 
available. This result conducts to twofold relevant consideration. First, licensing is recognized as a 
strategy to open up the potential of internal capabilities, while the licensee firms apprehend in a 
passive way. Second, the consequential complementarity-relation presupposes that licensing may 
not be a relevant diversification strategy if firms deviate too much from their internal existing core 
businesses (Lowe and Taylor, 1998). 
Finally, a further alternative to consider licensee’s perspective has been proposed by Ziedonis 
(2007). He provided interesting insights on the determinants of the licensee’s choice. Indeed, after 
having demonstrated a positive relationship between the level of technological uncertainty and the 
firm’s propensity to purchase an option agreement before licensing, he analyzed the effect of firm 
characteristics on the level of technological uncertainty. According to the author, a firm makes its 
decision following the real-option logic. In this respect, recalling the absorptive capacity argument 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002), he suggested that 
both firm’s ability to evaluate external technologies, based on its extant technological knowledge 
base and the degree of familiarity between firm’s knowledge base and licensed technologies, 
declines the possibility to purchase an option before involving in a licensing agreement. This is a 
consequence of the lower level of uncertainty related to the licensing agreement. 
While the researchers have mainly studied the firm’s propensity to sell their technologies, the 
strategic and economic determinants for licensing-in practices are still under-investigated. 
More recent works (Leone and Reichstein, 2012; Mulotte et al., 2012; Wang and Li-Ying, 2012; 
Tsai and Wang, 2009, Laursen Leone and Torrisi , 2010) dedicated attention to licensee’s 
perspective, but the results about the effects of inward licensing strategy are controversial. Among 
the studies focused on licensee’s point of view, the established firms’ licensing activities have been 
investigating. Specifically, the majority of research efforts is addressed to the analysis of the impact 
of inward licensing on innovation performance. Leone and Reichstein (2012) state that in-licensing 
fosters invention and, in particular, time to invention is longer for licensees that sign license 
agreements that contain a grant-back clause compared with licensees that sign license agreements 
with no grant-back clause. In showing that licensees are faster at inventing, the authors measure the 
time to invention in months extracted by considering license date as the onset of risk, and date of 
application for first patent filed after the signing of the license agreement as the transition time. 
Muloitte et al.(2012) report that the use of in-licensing for initial entry to a business domain can 
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detract from the performance of subsequent autonomous endeavors in the domain, as a result of 
superstitious learning and overconfidence produced by the partial learning from in-licensing and 
ensuing causal ambiguity. The results support this prediction. Firms that relied on pre-entry licenses 
gained lower sales in their next independent ventures than those that straightway opt for an 
independent entry. Reporting another recent work, Wang et al. (2012) in demonstrating the 
empirical implications of “learning-by licensing” concept (Johnson, 2002), take into account the 
impact of specific licensed-knowledge features, as moderators, on the innovative outcome of 
licensee firms. The authors measure the innovation results as the cumulative number of patents 
applied for by the firm within the 5 years after the year in which the licensing deals has been 
agreed. Cockburn et al. (2010), examining the link that connect fragmented intellectual property 
rights and the firm’s success in innovative terms, found that firms operating in more fragmented 
intellectual property contexts have a higher probability of in-licensing. The authors found that the 
relation between intellectual property dissipation and innovative performance is negative, but 
exclusively for firms that involved in in-licensing. 
Among the few studies on licensee’s perspective, even less have investigated the new venture’s 
licensee perspective. We try to fill this gap, shedding light on the effects of inward licensing in the 
context of new ventures. 
 
 
1.2.3 New Ventures And Licensing 
The liabilities of newness and its consequential resource, financial, organizational constraints, 
experiential biases of which a new venture suffers, are a double-edged sword. On one hand, due to 
these aspects, a young firm is forced to rely on external sources, on the other, these constraints 
represent the conditions under which the benefits provided by an inward licensing strategy could be 
partially suppressed.  
Inward licensing can support newly established ventures to accurately advance their products 
(Kotabe et al., 1996); to overcome weaknesses in their product designs, manufacturing and 
marketing skills (Killing, 1977); to build the skills necessary for speedy product commercialization 
(Teece, 1986; Allen, 2003) because they often are in deficit of the complementary technologies 
required to make their innovations ready for the market (Zahra, 1996). Licensing allows young 
firms, characterized by several constraints, to gain a privileged entryway to asset developed by 
other companies, rather than making investments in undetermined R&D activities that may not 
generate these capabilities; it also enables new ventures to escape from costly investments in 
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technologies with uncertain futures and, instead, concentrate on those activities that differentiate 
their products from those of their rivals. The experience biases in assembling resources and 
capabilities, the limited manager’s capacity to develop all the skills needed and quickly 
commercialize their technologies, several constraints, the need for flexibility, time compression 
diseconomies in capability building (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) and the uncertainty that surrounds 
internal R&D suggests that new ventures should seek licensing and other external sources to 
augment their internal capabilities, would encourage them to rely on other companies’ technologies 
through a licensing agreement.  
Although license technologies from other companies offers several benefits, some conditions may 
suppress the positive effects of these practices. In particular, the downsides of inward licensing 
materialize primarily because efforts at acquiring and absorbing external knowledge are sometimes 
unsuccessful. To fully exploit the opportunities extractable from external sources, startups depend 
on their organizational and managerial resources and capabilities (Almeida et al., 2003) and the 
advantage from the linkages to outside sources requires a substantial investment of resources (Dyer 
and Nobeoka, 2000), but a newly established firm suffers from liabilities of newness and smallness, 
that prevent them to exploit the licensing-in benefits. Among new ventures, the impact of inward 
technology licensing on innovation activity has been emphasized by few scholars (Zahra et al., 
2005), but empirically this relation has been measured by Tsai and Wang (2009).  
Zahra et al. (2005), through an empirical study of 361 US new ventures, concluded their work 
stating that industry characteristics and competitive strategy condition the  new ventures’ choice to 
apply an inward licensing strategy or not. The main driving force that promote the utilization of a 
licensing-in strategy is the acknowledgement of licensing-in as a tool of decreasing costs and 
maintaining strategic elasticity while building their capabilities. Tsai and Wang (2007) show that 
inward technology licensing does not significantly improve new venture’s innovation performance, 
nor does the interaction of inward technology licensing and internal R&D. The authors assume that 
the results of their study provide both good and bad news for the role of inward technology 
licensing on firm performance. After controlling the extraneous factors, the positive outcome of this 
evaluation is that, when the effect of internal R&D efforts is accounted for, inward technology 
licensing has a significantly positive contribution to the acquiring firm’s performance. Put 
differently, the results suggest that internal R&D efforts introduce a positive effect on the impact of 
inward technology licensing on firm performance. Tsai and Wang (2007) set out to investigate the 
extent to which the investment of inward technology licensing by firms affects their performance. 
In this study, firm performance, is measured,  in line with its economic aspect, by value added as 
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the major purpose of inward technology acquisition for a firm in general is to enhance value added 
through product or process innovation. Value added in the dataset is estimated by sales from output 
less cost of material input.  
From the perspective of learning and innovation (Tsai et al., 2007), inward technology licensing is a 
particular type of external technology acquisition, representing a firm’s efforts to use technological 
knowledge that formally lay outside its boundaries. Due to the important role young firms play for 
economic and technological development, innovation in the context of new ventures received much 
interest in external knowledge acquisition literature (Jones et al., 2000; West and Noel, 2009), 
describing both positive and negative implications for newly established firms. Literature, stressing 
the positive effects of developing innovation with external partners, proposes that especially new 
and small firms rarely have the resources and capabilities to respond to the innovation demands at 
any given time (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Thus, the combination 
of internal and external sources makes possible for  resource-scare firms to dilate their capacity of 
producing innovations and delivering them to the market. Resulting, the probability of successful 
innovation enhances, in turn, the higher level of cash-flow (Zahra and Bogner, 2000).  
Conversely, other literature challenges the benefits of developing innovations through external 
collaborations. Some of the most frequent pains in collaborating with external partners are the great 
complexities with regard to coordination efforts, protection of intellectual property, appropriation of 
rents (Kelley et al., 2009). Moreover, in order to benefit from external collaborations, firms need to 
have experience in the domain, but, especially in comparison to their larger counterparts, new 
ventures might be suffering from the experiential shortfall in managing external collaborations. 
Moreover, new firms might face hostile terms in collaborative strategies, at least in initial years of 
their lives, due to the liability of smallness and liability of newness: a young firm lacks the 
legitimacy and, thus, can be expected to suffer from dominance of external innovation partners. 
Since new and small firms generally have few development projects, their dependence on the 
success of these projects is high. 
While in the external acquisition literature, the relationship between innovation rate of a new 
venture and external sources is documented, in the licensing literature, this relationship has not been 
largely developed and even more under examined is the impact of the adoption of an in-licensing 
strategy on survival probabilities. 
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Inward licensing gives the new venture easy and fast access to new knowledge, offsetting the 
limitations of their inexperience and newness, but scarce attention has been paid to the long term 
effects of in-licensing on firm’s rate of innovativeness and on firm performance. 
The few authors, involved in investigating the new venture’s inward licensing strategy, have been 
primarily engaged in explaining the conditions and determinants that affect licensing’s propensity, 
under-studying the impact of inward licensing on short and long term innovative and survival 
performance. We would like to fill this gap in the new venture’s inward licensing literature, by 
investigating the impact that the in-licensing strategy exerts on long-term innovation and economic 
outcomes. 
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2.1 NEW VENTURE’S INWARD LICENSING: WHO AND WHAT? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Much is known about intensity of licensing, its evolution, the  characteristics, motivations and 
obstacles met by companies doing or willing to license. Less is known about the inward licensing 
strategy among new ventures’ licensee. We try to do a first step in this direction, identifying the 
factors that distinguish a new born firm, that decide to acquire an asset externally developed 
through a licensing agreement, from a new born firm that prefer  not apply this kind of strategy. In 
so doing, we rely on confidential version of the  Kauffman Firm Database. This  study only 
provides a descriptive analysis on the characteristics that distinguish a new venture licensee from a 
new venture non-licensee. Therefore, its main purpose  is to explore the database at our disposal.  
Our main findings suggest mainly that 1) new ventures licensees come from the manufacturing 
industry, while their counterparts come from the Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services; 2) 
new ventures licensees are usually smaller than their counterparts and they are product- provider; 3) 
an higher number of new ventures licensees, compared to non-licensees, born as a purchase of 
franchise; 4) new ventures have constantly higher level of debt and equity. Even more surprisingly, 
we find that the number of new ventures that in-license copyrights and trademarks is higher than 
those new ventures that in-license patents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: licensing-in; licensing-out; new ventures; patents, copyrights, trademarks 
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INTRODUCTION 
The high and uncontrolled level of competition, the not so long life-cycles of products, the 
heterogeneous and extended technological opportunities force firms to be innovative at a more rapid 
pace. To get this purpose, a firm has not divert its attention from R&D expenditures, hence 
requiring rapid access to complementary new knowledge. Therefore, innovative firms are 
increasingly dependent on external sources of knowledge rather than conducting in-house research. 
This reliance on knowledge developed outside firms’ boundaries has further increased the number 
of technological transactions and incremented the development of markets for technology. A market 
for technology is related to transactions for the use, diffusion and creation of technology (Arora et 
al., 2001). Since the publication of the book ‘Markets for technology’ (Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Gambardella, 2001), more relevant are becoming the theoretical and empirical studies that started 
inquiring the role of technology licensing, as channel through which gain access to knowledge and, 
at the same time, sell knowledge in the market for technology. 
Research engagement in technology licensing field is centred on the implications of licensing both 
at industry and at firm level. Many contributions focused on the determinants of  firms’ licensing 
strategy, namely which factors promote firms to sell their technologies to external partners. At an 
industry level, attributes such as the industry structure, the product market differentiation and the 
appropriability regime are recognized as the principal stimuli of firms’ licensing behaviour (Arora 
& Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fosfuri, 2006; Lichtenthaler, 2008). At a firm level, the lack of control over 
complementary assets is recognized to have an impact on firms’ aptitude to licensing phenomenon, 
explaining the rising of small technology-based firms (Gans & Stern, 2003).  
Among these studies the characteristics of new venture’s licensee have been underexplored. We try 
to identify the circumstances under which a new born firm decides to gain an asset externally 
developed through a licensing agreement. In order to do so, we exploit the Kauffman Database, 
including information on 4,928 new ventures founded in 2004 in Us.  Therefore, this study has the 
primary objective of presenting in greater detail the data source at the base of this dissertation, and 
providing a  descriptive overview of the diffusion of licensing-in phenomenon in the context of new 
ventures. It also aims at highlight some key characteristics of the new ventures implementing a 
licensing-in strategy, as compared to the rest of the sample. In order to disentangle differences 
between licensees and non-licensees, we have adopted some  dimensions along which conduct these 
preliminary analysis. Among the chosen dimensions, we include: size, industry, financing method 
and origin.  The aim of this work is therefore exploratory, and it should be interpreted as an attempt 
to obtain a clearer understanding of the licensing-in phenomenon in the context of new ventures.  
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Coherently with this objective, we first briefly summarize the most recent empirical literature on the 
determinants that encourage and foster an established  firm to adopt a licensing-in strategies. 
Therefore, before proceeding with the investigation of  the peculiar elements that characterize a new 
venture licensee, we provide a descriptive summary of the most recent empirical surveys aimed at 
analysing the and rationales underpinning a  licensing-in  strategy, from licensee’s point of view.  
 
According to the report elaborated by Radauer and Dudenbostel (2013)
2
,  the most convincing 
motive to in-license patents is to guarantee freedom to operate. The need to ‘close technical gaps 
and blind spots for the firm´s core technology’ came after. The third factor is ‘enabling rapid time to 
market’ as well as ‘access to complementary know-how to develop the core technology further’ as 
well as expanding the business or R&D according to new trajectories. Interestingly, escaping from 
costs and risks related to R&D is among the factors that play, on average, less of a role. Even more 
surprisingly is the deduction that ‘learning-by-licensing’ is classified on average as a scarcely 
influential factor. It is outstanding that those firms which have intentions to in-license patents, but 
currently do not do so, have a more “pro-active” list of motives. Enabling rapid time to market 
(Leone and Reichstein, 2012)  is the preeminent factor followed by filling the technological gaps 
and gain access to complementary technology to support the development of  the core technology 
(Laursen et al., 2010). The group of currently in-licensing firms seem to be, by contrast, more in a 
“reactive” trend, where ensuring freedom-to-operate and keeping away from patent disputes plays 
much more of a role to engage in in-licensing strategy. Rising from the survey is the result that, in 
the first category, “pro-active”, are included the small and medium size firms, that tend to have 
more frequently pro-active motives to in-license, while, in the second category, are included the 
large firms that have reactive motives: ensure freedom-to-operate and avoid litigation are prevailing 
as basis for in-licensing.  
The report attests the obstructions to in-licensing as well. The most implicative obstacles to an 
inward licensing strategy are unacceptable terms of the licensor and the refusal of the potential 
licensors to grant licenses at all. These outcomes indicate that, on average, low appositeness is 
given to aspects such as ‘lack of experience with in-licensing’ or ‘lack of model contracts’. The 
barriers have to be explored on the supply side of technologies: too high prices charged by the 
                                                          
2
 This report has been elaborated by consortium consisting of Incentim – KU Leuven Research and Development, 
KITeS - Università Bocconi and Technopolis Consulting Group as subcontractor to perform a study on the 
‘Measurement and analysis of knowledge and R&D exploitation flows, assessed by patent and licensing data’. Part of 
the study was the execution of a survey on patent licensing behavior of European firms. This part of the study, 
performed by Technopolis and executed between March 2012 and April 2013, is the subject of the report we are 
analysing. 
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licensor, as well as unconditional refusal of the potential licensor to grant a license or no 
need/interest to license in.  
Some other obstacles have to be added: the ‘not-invented-here’ syndrome, whereby knowledge 
created outside the boundaries of the firms is evaluated as less worthy  than know-how created 
within the firms. One comment was that in-licensing would decrease own creativity and create more 
dependence on external organisations, as suggested by Muloitte et al. (2012). Some answering firms 
purvey some supplementary annotations to the motives that prevent the implementation of an 
inward licensing strategy: being approached by an unsuitable licensor: “A barrier is non-
understanding of the licensor of our business. Sometimes, the technology is ok but does not fit into 
our needs.”  
Firms which are not in-licensing and they are not planning to do so simply state as most important 
barrier that they do not want or need to in-license patents. For large firms, a justification could be 
that these firms possess a sufficiently extensive patent pipeline cover their technology needs, 
whereas, in the case of small and medium firms, it could be that these firms are so extremely 
specialised in their areas, and the respective technology less reliant on other/complementary 
technologies, that there may be slightly a compulsion for in- licensing. 
We would like to extend these main findings, assessing their validity in the scenario of new 
ventures as licensees and, consequently, investigate the behaviour of new born firms that decide to 
in-licence a patent. In so doing, we rely on confidential version of the Kauffman Firm Database. 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS: Kauffman Firm Foundation 
Entrepreneurship plays a dynamic role in the country’s economic activity. This is the main reason 
why accurate and detail information about new business development and sustainability is essential. 
Relying on them, it is possible to establish public and private programs that encourage new business 
development. However, obtaining accurate information on new firm dynamics is not always easy. 
The pivotal tool to get these information is the survey, but  surveys of new businesses tend to be 
hard to implement and typically have produced low response rates because of the difficulty of 
obtaining new business owners’ cooperation. Consistent with its mission to advance 
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entrepreneurship and the study of new business creation and development, the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation
3
 sponsored the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS).  
As part of an effort to gather more data on new businesses in the United States, the Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation sponsored the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS), a panel study of new 
businesses founded in 2004 and tracked over their early years of operation. In detail, the firms are 
tracking over the first 8 years of their existence. The KFS’ main objective is to address the 
informational gaps related to the study of entrepreneurship.  
The Kauffman Foundation contracted with Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., (MPR) to design 
and conduct a rigorous survey to understand entrepreneurial patterns by gathering information from 
newly formed businesses. The KFS collects data about the nature of new business formation 
activity; characteristics of the strategy, offerings, and employment patterns of new businesses; the 
nature of the financial and organizational arrangements of these businesses; and the characteristics 
of their founders. Two initial actions were employed to inform the design process and test the 
validity of the assumptions in the proposed research: (1) a review of business and other relevant 
literature, that  included about sixty articles and related surveys that focused on business statistics 
and the dynamics of business formation (2) consultation with an advisory group composed of 
probable KFS data users. In particular, this review included survey instruments from the Economic 
Census, the Survey of Small Business Finance, and the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics 
MPR developed questions on business characteristics, strategy and innovation, business 
characteristics, strategy and innovation, business organization and human resource benefits, 
business finances, and work behaviours and demographics of owner-operator(s).  
For what regards the methodology of data collection, a random sample of 32,469 businesses was 
released for data collection on the Baseline Survey, which was conducted between July 2005 and 
July 2006. The research team completed interviews with principals of 4,928 businesses that started 
operations in 2004, that corresponds to a 43 percent response rate. A self- administered Web survey 
and Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) were used to collect data, and KFS 
respondents were paid $50 to complete the interview. CATI completes accounted for 3,781 (77 
percent) and Web completes accounted for 1,147 (23 percent) of the interviews. The results across 
sampling strata show that 2,034 interviews were completed in the two high- technology strata, 
                                                          
3 Founded in the mid-1960s by the entrepreneur and philanthropist Ewing Marion Kauffman, the Kauffman 
Foundation is based in Kansas City, Mo. It is among the largest private foundations in the United States.  
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whereas the remaining 2,894 interviews were completed among non-high-tech businesses. 
Therefore, the First Follow-Up Survey sample consisted of the 4,928 businesses that completed the 
Baseline Survey. The First Follow-Up was conducted between June 2006 and January 2007, and 
3,998 interviews were completed—an 89 percent response. The KFS dataset provides researchers a 
unprecedented chance to conduct research on a panel of new businesses from start-up to 
sustainability, with longitudinal data centring on topics such as financial method; the products, 
services, and innovations these businesses possess and develop in their early years of existence; and 
the characteristics of those who own and operate them. 
Figure 2.1 provides a breakdown of our sample by industry. The KFS procures industry information 
by two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level. As illustrated, the most 
common industry sectors, for all the new ventures included in the raw database, are professional, 
management, and educational services; retail trade; administrative, support, waste management, and 
remediation services; and construction. 
Figure 2.1 - Business Distribution by Industry 
Industries  Number of firms  Percentage  
54. Professional, Management, and Educational 
Services 
1,229 17%  
44-45. Retail trade 484 14% 
56. Administrative and Support, and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
396 11% 
23. Construction  353 11% 
81. Other services (expect Public Administration) 434 9% 
31-33. Manufacturing 881 6% 
42. Wholesale Trade  198 5% 
53. Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing 176 5% 
52. Finance and Insurance 152 4% 
62. Health Care and Social Assistance 114 3% 
51. Information  163 3% 
48-49. Transportation and Warehousing 97 2% 
71. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 110 2% 
72. Accommodation and Food Services 88 2% 
11. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 45 1% 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey, Baseline Data; 
Tabulations by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc 
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The  primary purpose of the survey commissioned by the Kauffman Foundation, is to deeply 
understand entrepreneurial activity and the  logics and dynamics of business development in the 
United States, addressing attention on two levels of analysis:  the owner and the business level. In 
so doing, it has been possible to close the informational gap related to new business development. 
Therefore, in the light of the purposes for which this database was created, it has been used by 
several scholars (Coleman S., Cole R., Crawford C., Berman R.) involved in the entrepreneurship 
and new firms’ formation literature. in order to get access to the confidential version of data,  
researchers are called to apply for a Kauffman-sponsored seat through the Kauffman Foundation. 
To apply for a Kauffman-sponsored seat, the applicant has to  exhibit  a study proposal that outlines 
research project and the need for using the confidential data, as opposed to the public use version 
available for download on Kauffman website. We adhered to this process and we obtained the 
access to the confidential version of the Kauffman Firm Database, submitting the embryonic ideas 
on which this dissertation is built.  
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: A Descriptive Overview Of Licensing-In Strategies By New 
Ventures 
Our purpose, in developing this article, is twofold: explore the database on which we rely for the 
dissertation; understand the distribution of new ventures that implement an inward licensing 
strategy and comprehend the intensity of this phenomenon in the scenario of newly established 
firms. Although the thesis is especially devoted to study the technology-based licensing agreements, 
that, therefore, deal with patents as object of exchange between firms,  in the present research 
project we also include the inward licensing of copyrights and trademark. In so doing, we have the 
chance to elaborate a comprehensive framework on the licensing-in  phenomenon in its wholeness.  
The rising employment of inward licensing among new-born ventures is confirmed by data 
provided by Kauffman Foundation. On 4.928 new businesses founded in 2004, 493 carry into effect 
an inward licensing strategy in their founding year. 493 firms of which 135 acquire from external 
sources patents, 177 copyright and 181 trademarks. These data suggest that inward licensing 
represents a relevant strategy among new ventures,  considered as licensees.  
 
We are interested in assessing the evolution over the new venture’s life-cycle of the recourse to 
acquire a patent, a copyright or a trademark through a licensing agreement. As shown in Figure 2.2, 
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the plenty of new ventures that decide to get hold of a patent is almost constant over the first 8 years 
of existence, exhibiting a slight decrease in the last years of analysis.  
This result indicates that the timing at which a new venture puts into practice an inward licensing 
strategy is ordinarily at its initial development stages, in early years of its existence. The reason, 
underpinning this option, is to be found in the urgent need to overcome the constraints and 
shortages that characterized a new venture, as consequence of liabilities of newness and liabilities 
of smallness. In other words, an inward licensing strategy is undertaken by a newly established firm 
as one of the first alternatives on which build  its technology strategy, defined as the sum of a firm’s 
choices on how to develop and exploit its technological resources (Zahra, 2000). Indeed, in so 
doing, it can not only reduce resources and experiential constraints and shortages caused by being, 
by definition, young and small, but also broaden its knowledge base and its set of technology assets. 
As stated by Zahra (2000), technology, the sum of a firm’s knowledge and skills, performs a 
primary role in determining the advancing of new ventures and size up the ability of new ventures 
to offer the products (services), gain market acceptance, survive, and achieve financial success. 
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Figure 2.2 – New ventures declaring a patent in-licensing 
 
 
Patents are accepted as one of the basic tools for the inter-firm transfer of knowledge through 
licensing-in. The application of patent information and patent statistics as measure of innovation 
have extensively spread in the investigation of innovation outcomes. Recently, some reports (Patlice 
Survey, 2013) have been commissioned against the increasing relevance of patents, as pointed out 
by the rising number of patent applications (more than 50% increase in yearly applications at the 
EPO by comparison to 10 years ago) (EPO 2012) and a much wider employment of patents today 
purposes other than preserving intellectual properties.  
Since the definition of markets for technology entails not only patents but also the most generic 
intellectual property, we include in our analysis the licensing-in of copyrights and trademarks, 
respectively Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. To the best of our knowledge, no antecedent studies have 
investigated the acquisition of copyright and/or trademarks through a licensing agreement, even if, 
as displayed in the two upcoming figures, new ventures are likely to apply for a licensing deal 
whose object of exchange is a copyright or a trademark. To be precise, in the database we are 
relying on, a copyright is defined as “The legal right granted to authors, composers, artists and 
publishers to protect their thoughts and ideas for exclusive publication, reproduction, sale and 
distribution of their works”, while a trademark is “Words, names, symbols or devices, or any 
combination of these used to identify the goods of a business and to distinguish these goods from 
the goods of others”. 
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Figure 2.3 – New ventures declaring a copyright in-licensing 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – New Ventures declaring a trademark in-licensing 
 
 
The next graph, Figure 2.5, reveals an unexpected evidence: a new venture is more likely to acquire 
through a licensing agreement a copyright or trademarks rather than a patent. This result could be 
counterintuitive. 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
% of new ventures licensing-
in a copyright 
4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
Licensees 177 138 128 108 101 79 65 63 
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
% of new ventures 
licensing-in a trademark 
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Licensees 181 150 121 97 76 75 46 41 
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Figure 2.5 - Patent, copyrights and trademarks in-licensing 
 
 
As anticipated,  the Figure 2.5 reports the amount of new ventures that, all over the period of 
analysis, namely from founding year (2004) to 2011, lay hands on a copyright/trademark/patent 
through a licensing agreement. What is foreseen is that the sum total of new born firms that try out 
for a deal whose object of trade is copyright/trademark is constantly higher than those that choose to 
be a patent licensee.  
This result could be interpreted as the need for a new venture to make use of inward licensing not 
only to close the technological gaps, but also to build a strong reputation. Relying on already known 
words, names, symbols or devices, or any combination of these used to identify the products is the 
same as take part of a consolidated network, appear reliable and accountable, establish relationships 
with external stakeholders, thereby overcoming the liability of underdeveloped social ties. 
Since this dissertation deals mainly with technology –based licensing agreement, the following 
analysis, we will  be exclusively conduct on patent in-licensing. The features and dimensions we 
have adopted in order to highlight the dissimilarities  between new ventures that decide to become 
licensee and new ventures who do not opt for this choice, are mainly related to business 
characteristics and the following: industry, final outcomes offered by the firm ( service or product), 
size, origin, financing patterns.  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Patent in-licensing 135 94 91 74 53 43 32 22 
Copyrights in-licensing 177 138 128 108 101 79 65 63 
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 The first dimension along which we conduct our analysis in order to outline the dissimilarities 
between a new venture that decide to be a licensee and a new venture that choose the opposite 
decision is the industry in which the two groups operate in their first year of existence, in 2004. As 
exhibited in the next figures, Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, the most determining dissimilarities 
between the two groups, licensees and non-licensees, is that the majority of new ventures licensees 
come from the manufacturing industries, defined by North America Industry Classification system 
as “a sector that comprises establishments engaged in the mechanical, physical, or chemical 
transformation of materials, substances, or components into new products”, while their 
counterparts come from the professional, Scientific, and Technical Services defined by North 
America Industry Classification system as “a sector that comprises establishments that specialize in 
performing professional, scientific, and technical activities for others. These activities require a 
high degree of expertise and training. Activities performed include: legal advice and 
representation; accounting, bookkeeping, and payroll services; architectural, engineering, and 
specialized design services; computer services; consulting services; research services; advertising 
services; photographic services; translation and interpretation services; veterinary services; and 
other professional, scientific, and technical services”.  
Figure 2.6 - Distribution of No patent licensees by industry in year 2004  
Industries Number of firms  % of no patent licensee 
operating in each industry  
54. Professional, Management, and Educational Services 
1175 
 
25% 
44-45. Retail trade 514 11% 
56. Administrative and Support, and Waste Management and 
Remediation Services 345 
7% 
23. Construction  386 8% 
81. Other services (expect Public Administration) 443 9% 
31-33. Manufacturing 666 14% 
42. Wholesale Trade  212 4% 
53. Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing 175 4% 
52. Finance and Insurance 182 4% 
62. Health Care and Social Assistance 119 2% 
51. Information  155 3% 
48-49. Transportation and Warehousing 108 2% 
71. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 102 2% 
72. Accommodation and Food Services 93 2% 
11. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 40 1% 
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Figure 2.7 - Distribution of patent licensees by industry in year 2004  
 
Industries  Number of firms  % of patent licensee 
operating in each 
industry 
54. Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 25 19% 
44-45. Retail trade 8 6% 
56. Administrative and Support, and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 11 8% 
23. Construction  3 2% 
81. Other services (expect Public Administration) 9 7% 
31-33. Manufacturing 52 39% 
42. Wholesale Trade  5 4% 
53. Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing 1 1% 
52. Finance and Insurance 3 2% 
62. Health Care and Social Assistance 2 1% 
51. Information  5 4% 
48-49. Transportation and Warehousing 3 2% 
71. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation 3 2% 
72. Accommodation and Food Services 4 3% 
11. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 0 0% 
 
To make the reading of the data, just reported, clearer, we created a histogram, in figure 2.8, that 
highlights the differences  in the industries in which the two groups of new ventures, licensees and 
no-licensees, operate.   
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Figure 2.8 - Distribution of patent licensees and patent no-licensee by industry in 2004  
 
 
        
 
Complementary to the industry, is the variable that classify a new venture according to its final 
outcomes. Strictly speaking, we try to answer to the question: is patent licensing-in more frequent 
among new ventures that provide products or among new ventures that provide services? 
Figure 2.9 - Distribution of licensees by service 
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Figure 2.10 - Distribution of licensees by products 
 
 
Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 are empirical evidences supporting the idea that patent licensees are 
more likely to provide products, while those new ventures that settle to not acquire external assets 
through a licensing agreement, are mainly services providers. We perform econometric test, that 
confirms this results (p-value< 0-05). More specifically, we run an independent-sample t-test. It 
compares the difference in the means from the two groups to a given value (usually 0). Put 
differently, it tests whether the difference in the means is 0. 
The business origin is interrelated  to the decision to license in or not. Indeed, the origin of a new 
venture can define the boundaries of its knowledge base, its amount of tangible and intangible 
resources and consequently, its competencies. Then, the origin can influence the choice of going 
outside firm’s boundaries and rely on external sources, adopting a strategy such as patent in-
licensing. We examine and verify for some descriptions of how a business can get started. 
According to the way in which new ventures are founded, they diverge regularly in their 
competences and abilities to collect and take advantage of resources in building matchless 
organizational capabilities (Miller & Camp, 1985) that can produce differences in their achievement 
(Shrader & Simon, 1997; Zahra, 1996). The question associated to the way in which a new venture 
has been established is the following: “Which of the following best describes how [NAME 
BUSINESS] was started. Was it 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
no-licensee 0,5 0,5 0,47 0,46 0,47 0,45 0,44 0,44 
licensee 0,78 0,78 0,69 0,72 0,81 0,67 0,78 0,77 
0 
0,1 
0,2 
0,3 
0,4 
0,5 
0,6 
0,7 
0,8 
0,9 
Product  
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1. A new business, branch or subsidiary owned by an existing business 
2. A business inherited from someone else 
3.  A new, independent business created by a single person or a team of people 
4. The purchase of an existing business 
5. The purchase of a franchise 
6. An organization designed for social and charitable objectives and legally established as 
“not-for-profit” 
7.  the business started some other way? (SPECIFY)”  
Figure 2.11 shows signs of a slight disparity between the two groups. The 93% of non-licensees are 
started up as new and independent business, as well as licensees. The main discrepancy is in the 
percentage of business originated as purchase of franchise. 10% of new venture licensee born as 
purchase of franchise, only 2% of new venture licensee born as purchase of franchise. This 
settlement  could be justified by the awareness of the firms, born as purchase of a franchise, of what 
they need to build assets, and resources complementary to those that they already have. The 
presence of a knowledge base already structured entails an higher level of absorptive capacity, 
necessary to exploit the patent acquired through a licensing agreement. 
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Figure 2.11 - Distribution of patent licensees and no patent-licensees by origin 
 
 
 
 
Adding on the origin and the industry, we take into consideration the variable “firm size” as well. 
Consistent with Almeida and colleagues (2003), we propose that larger firms have more chances to 
reach external knowledge because of the increased number of interconnection to the outside 
environment. We measure the firm size as the amount of employees involved in undertaking the 
firm’s activities. We labeled our sample in 4 groups according to the number of employees (Rauder 
and Dudenbostel, 2013): 
Micro: less than 10 employees 
Small: less than 50 employees 
Medium: less than 100 employees 
Large: more than 100 employees 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we remark upon the graphs, Figure 2.12, stating that the larger the firm, 
the higher probability of being a non-licensee. 
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Figure 2.12 - Distribution of patent licensees and no patent licensees by size 
 
 
We continue our analysis, on the representative attribute of a new venture licensee, cross-examining  
its financial structure. One distinguishing element of a licensing agreement is the payment of fees or 
royalties to the licensor. Put together this last assessment to the financial constraints that 
characterized a new venture, we can infer that the financing method is of remarkable interest. 
We perform a preliminary analysis on the raw Kauffman Firm Database, that offers the coming 
highlights. Approximately 44 percent of newly born firms indicates to not have debt financing in 
the course of their first year of activities. Various businesses were launched with a hardly any 
degree of debt financing—17 percent started with $5,000 or less; around 11 percent began with 
$100,000 or more. Closely to 80 percent of new ventures registered a net positive equity investment 
in their initial period if operations. Almost 10 percent invested $100,000 of equity into their 
businesses, while another 33 percent made an investment between $10,001 and $100,000. Round 
about one quarter of startups invested less than $5,000. The greater number of equity invested 
derived from the business owners themselves. Only 10 percent of the businesses in the Kauffman 
Firm Survey employed external equity sources in their earliest year of advancement. 
Going in depth, we weigh the two groups of new ventures, licensee and non-licensee according to 
their debt and equity trajectories. The data on which we are relying, comprehend information about 
the range of debt and the range of equity. To each new ventures is asked to indicate which of the 
following listed 9 level of debt or equity, they belong:  
1) $500 or less 
2) $501 - $1,000 
77% 
6% 
1% 16% 
No-licensees 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
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3) $1,001 - $3,000 
4) $3,001 - $5,000 
5) $5,001 - $10,000 
6) $10,001 - $25,000 
7) $25,001 - $100,000 
8) $100,001-$1,000,000 
9) $1,000,001 or more 
The next figures, Figure 2,13 and Figure 2.14, demonstrate that the licensees have higher level of 
both debt and equity. This result is consistent with the initial condition in which a new venture 
lives: shortages of capital and necessity to pay royalties accorded to the licensing agreement.  
 
Figure 2.13 - Distribution of patent licensees and no patent-licensees by range of debt 
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Figure 2.14 - Distribution of patent licensees and no patent licensees by range of equity 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS and FUTURE RESEARCH 
This report has pointed the way to manifold findings with regard to patent in-licensing performed 
by newly founded U.S. firms, using releases of the Kauffman Firm Survey. Ambition of the present 
paper is to apprehend innate characteristics of those new born firms that arranged to be involved in 
a licensing deal, as licensee. This aspect has not been elaborated yet in licensing literature. The 
prominence of licensing has intensified over the last times, as made evident by the majority of firms 
implicated in a licensing agreement. Indeed, they have disclosed an increasing licensing revenues 
over time and their willingness to be part of a growing number of licensing deals. Albeit this 
evidence,  the licensing phenomenon within new venture context is still an open point in question. 
At best of our knowledge, the single research attempt, concretely addressed in this direction, has 
been done by Zahra and colleagues in 2005. The authors studied the rationales that encourage a new 
venture to be a licensee, but the authors focused exclusively on exogenous factors: industry 
dynamism and competitive strategy. Moreover, while the authors consider inward licensing as a 
tools of decreasing costs and preserving strategic elasticity and adaptability while building their 
capacities, we recognize the role of inward licensing as a mean through which defeat the liabilities, 
that a new venture suffers, stemmed from being young and small. 
We try to add enrichment to the inward phenomenon in the new ventures’ framework, designating 
the common features that differentiate a licensee from a non-licensee. The chiefly breakthroughs 
about the characteristics of a new venture that decide to in-licensing a patent are the following:  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
No-licensee 4,2 2,5 2 1,7 1,5 1,3 1,2 1,7 
Licensee 5,7 4 3,5 3 3,4 2,3 2 1,8 
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 The new ventures licensees come mostly from the manufacturing industry, while their 
counterparts come from the from the professional, scientific, and technical aervices. 
 The new ventures licensees are usually smaller than their counterparts  
 An higher number of new ventures licensees, compared to non-licensees, born as a purchase 
of franchise. 
 The new ventures that make use of inward licensing are products- providers.  
 Licensees have constantly higher level of debt and equity.  
 New ventures that decide to be involved in a licensing agreement as licensee are products 
provider rather than services provider.  
 The number of new ventures that in-license copyrights and trademarks is higher than those 
new ventures that in-license patents.  
The most unexpected finding is about the “what” new ventures are used to in-license. 
New ventures are more likely to license-in copyrights and trademarks rather than a patent.  
We provide evidence that, in general terms, new ventures are more likely to license-in copyrights 
and trademarks rather than a patent. Inward licensing is, therefore, not only used to close 
technological holes and reduce time to market, but also to build a reputation relying on consolidated 
and reinforced symbols or devices, or any aggregation of these used to identify the goods of a 
business and to distinguish these goods from the goods of others.  
This study has only an exploratory approach, therefore its limitations are straightforward. Future 
research should therefore assess in a more systematic and robust way the antecedents of the 
licensing-in choice, using more sophisticated econometric approaches. In any case, it provides a 
rich insight into the specificities of new ventures adopting licensing-in strategies, therefore 
facilitating the interpretation of the results of the next empirical papers. A major outcome, indeed, 
regards the difficulty of directly comparing licensee vs non-licensee startups, given the presence of 
systematic differences between the two groups. This suggests the importance of adopting more 
sophisticated matching techniques, such as propensity score methods, in the analyses of the two 
groups. This is exactly the approach we will follow in our next chapter related to the survival 
chances of licensee firms.  
Many issues remain to be investigated in more depth by future research. This study should also be 
considered in light of some limitations, that are patterns on which develop future researches. First, 
according to us, the most important point to be investigated in depth is the logic according to which 
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a new venture is more prone to take possession of a copyright or a trademark than a patent. Second, 
we rely on the information base yielded by the Kauffman Firm Foundation. Forasmuch as, our 
sample is exclusively composed by firms born in United States, it should be constructive to work 
out  the same studies taking into account the differences across countries. Third, the analysis could 
be bring to fullness introducing information about the channels by which licensors get in touch with 
licensees, since a new venture, being new and small, has difficulties in searching the right partner. 
Fourth, the acquired facts about licensing deals at our disposal are related merely to the likelihood 
that a new venture is a licensee or not. It would be interested enlarge the base of information adding 
details about the patent exchanges.  
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2.2 EFFECT OF INWARD LICENSING ON NEW VENTURE’S SURVIVAL 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The liabilities of newness and the liabilities of smallness constrain new venture to strongly rely on  
external sources, but the contribution of external acquisition on new born firm’s longevity has not 
been explored yet. Albeit the relevance of this topic, little attention has been paid so far to its 
investigation, especially in the licensing context. In light of increasing licensing activities and 
practices, we dig into the inward licensing phenomenon in new ventures context. Employing the 
confidential version of panel data from the Kauffman Firm Survey, we  compare the survival rate of  
a new venture that decide to implement an inward licensing strategy in its first year of existence 
with the survival rate of a new venture that, in its first year of existence, do not get access to 
external knowledge through a licensing agreement. We choose to analyze the implementation of 
this strategy exclusively in founding year because, embracing the literature on the relevance of 
initial conditions (Bamford et al., 1999; Aspelund et al., 2005), we support the idea that early 
decisions adhere with the organization and engrave the firm in the long term.  
Unlike witnessed by the majority of stream of research, we expect a negative relationship between 
the decision of a new venture to be a licensee at its inception and its likelihood to survive. The 
econometric results support this hypothesis: a new born firm, that chooses, as initial technology 
strategy, to acquire knowledge externally developed through a licensing agreement, has lower 
probability to survive than its non-licensees counterparts, as result of longer speed to market 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: inward licensing; survival; time to market; new ventures 
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INTRODUCTION  
New ventures are characterized by liabilities of newness (Freeman et al., 1983, Bruderl and 
Schussler, 1990) and liabilities of smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and they undergo resource, 
financial, experiential and organizational constraints and biases. They fall short in terms of the 
resources and capabilities mandatory in dynamically changing and high-speed industries (Zahra et 
al., 2005). These conditions compel new venture to deeply rely on external sources. The necessity 
for elasticity and adaptability, the requirements for capability building (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), 
the uncertain contingency that encircle internal R&D and the shortfall of the complementary 
technologies essential to commercialize their innovations (Zahra, 1996), propose that new ventures 
should delve for external sources to augment their internal capabilities. Faced with inadequate facts 
and data for learning from their own experience, companies can collect technology and knowledge, 
from outside environment, developed by others’ experiences to cover their deficits (Baum et al., 
2000).  
Although it is extensively accepted among practitioners and academics that inward licensing is one 
of the most prevalent tool for the attainment of technological assets externally developed (Arora and 
Fosfuri, 2001; Kim and Vonortas, 2006; Athreye and Cantwell, 2007) and one of the most well-
defined method for the inter-firm transfer of technological knowledge (Anand and Khanna,2000; 
Gu and Lev, 2001), the role played by this strategy in the environment of new ventures has not been 
explored yet.  
 
Moreover, since the remarkable pace of licensing activities has animated  the concerns of scholars 
and promoted research production in this area over the last few decades (Bessy, 2002), the 
researchers have been solicited for an improved comprehension of the demand-side of licensing 
agreements (Caves et al., 1983; Atuahene-Gima, 1992, 1993; Atuahene-Gima and Patterson, 1993; 
Lowe and Taylor, 1998; Arora et al., 2001; Cesaroni, 2004). Some up-to-date works (Leone and 
Reichstein, 2012; Mulotte et al., 2013; Wang and Li-Ying, 2012; Tsai and Wang, 2009) bring into 
focus the licensee’s side among mature and established firms, but still overlooking the study of 
cases in which new born firms are involved as licensee.  
Indeed, regardless the licensee’s role is advancing in terms of general esteem among scholars, little 
inspection has been paid to new ventures as licensee, with only few exceptions by Atuahene-Gima, 
1993, Zahra et al., 2005 and Tsai et al., 2009. They span different features associated to the 
licensee’s behavior. Enlightenments on the licensing decision of the licensee firm have been 
introduced by Atuehene-Gima (1992, 1993). He investigated some factors affecting the firm’s 
intention or propensity to adopt technological inward licensing. Those factors are labeled into four 
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groups: firm’s characteristics, management characteristics, benefits and costs of inward technology 
licensing and external factors. Based on four items (the degree of urgency to license-in; the 
possibility the firm will in-license in the subsequent two years; the expectation the licensee will 
penetrate new product markets through licensing; the chances  that licensee will distend their actual 
product markets by licensing rather than by internal development), the inclination to exploit inward 
technology licensing naming the firm´s aptitude towards inward technology licensing. Amongst 
other, the most intriguing outcome he found was about the impact of the shortfall of internal new 
product development abilities, the satisfying inward technology licensing background,  and the felt 
advantages of the inward technology licensing on firms’ likely to make use of an inward technology 
licensing. Particularly, licensee firms were found to be more predisposed to select an inward 
technology licensing if : the lowest the level of their capabilities, the higher the level of perceived 
benefits from the license and the higher the satisfaction tied with the previous licensing experience. 
Following the same reasoning, Athuene-Gima and Patterson (1993) focused their attention on the 
examination of individual-level factors, and in particular on the perceptions of managers in their 
decisions to license technology from independent organizations according to their new product 
development strategy. The main objective of their work was to understand which benefits, costs and 
risks were involved and which ones have the greatest impact on the firm’s decision to license. The 
research displayed that firms make use of licensing in order to yield new products. In so doing, the 
firms have the chief purpose to  satisfy their  more paramount urgency to gain competitive 
advantage in the short run rather than gaining access  to potential technology.  
This finding is in line with the classic driving force of technology licensing: firms, through a 
licensing deal, are admitted to ready and consolidated technology by decreasing their financial 
vulnerability (Roberts and Barry, 1985; Chatterji, 1996). This justification reveals the habitual 
short-run purpose promoting the prospective licensee’s decision. Coupled with the described work 
by Atuehene-Gima (1992, 1993), Zahra and colleagues state that industry characteristics and 
competitive strategy condition the  new ventures’ choice to apply an inward licensing strategy or 
not. The main driving force that promote the utilization of a licensing-in strategy is the 
acknowledgement of licensing-in as a tool of decreasing costs and maintaining strategic elasticity 
while building their capabilities. Tsai and Wang (2009) show that inward technology licensing does 
not significantly improve new venture’s innovation performance, nor does the interaction of inward 
technology licensing and internal R&D. The authors assume that the results of their study provide 
both good and bad news for the role of inward technology licensing on firm performance. After 
controlling the extraneous factors, the positive outcome of this evaluation is that, when the effect of 
internal R&D efforts is accounted for, inward technology licensing has a significantly positive 
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contribution to the acquiring firm’s performance. To wit, the results imply that internal R&D efforts 
entail a positive effect on the impact of inward technology licensing on firm performance. Inward 
licensing gives the new venture easy and fast access to new knowledge, compensating the 
restrictions produced by their inexperience and newness, but insufficient attention has been paid to 
the long term effects of in-licensing on firm’s rate of innovativeness and on firm performance. 
In sum, Atuahene-Gima (1992) designated the constituents that promote a firm to licensing-in and 
recollected these constituents in the previous inward technology licensing experience, felt relative 
costs and benefits of inward technology licensing, consciousness of inward licensing opportunities, 
and the firm’s internal new product development and R&D capabilities. Zahra et al. (2005) found 
that the degree of new ventures’ practice of inward licensing emulates the demands of their 
industries and competitive strategies. Empirically,  the repercussions of inward technology licensing 
on innovation activity has been evaluated by Tsai and Wang (2009). The authors expose that inward 
technology licensing does not significantly upgrade new venture’s innovation performance, nor 
does the interplay of inward technology licensing and internal R&D. The few scholars, engaged in 
investigating the new venture’s inward licensing strategy, have been primarily engrossed in 
explaining the conditions and determinants that affect licensing’s propensity, under investigating 
the impact of inward licensing on performance and its different aspects.  
 
Across these studies, the impact of inward licensing phenomenon on new born firm’s survival 
probabilities is still an open matter. Consequently, this study sets out to fill in the research gap by 
analyzing the relationship between inward licensing at founding year and survival rate. The 
motivation why we analyze exclusively the new born firms that apply an inward licensing strategy 
at their founding year is because we are in line with the literature that stating initial resource 
management decisions are of special significance, as these decisions stick with the organization in 
the long run (Aspelund et al., 2005). As suggested by Bamford et al. (1999), early decisions and 
founding conditions have lasting effects which: affect the firm’s long lasting behavior, restrict its 
strategic array, and continue to impinge on its long-term performance. In these opening operations, 
the entrepreneurs fixes an initial strategy basing its decision on bundling of the resources at disposal 
and those they can practically procure. 
 
 
To verify these theorization, we use the confidential version of Kauffman Firm Database. The KFS 
is the largest longitudinal panel with an initial sample of 4.928 US firms that began operations in 
2004, surveyed annually from 2004 to 2011. Through propensity score matching procedure, we 
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create a database of 260 new ventures, 130 licensees in their founding year and 130 non-licensees, 
drawing on a panel of data collected from the founders of young firms as part of the Kauffman Firm 
Survey.  The results from our regression analyses show that the new ventures that decide to acquire 
a knowledge asset externally developed in its first year of  existence runs the risk to be slower in 
reaching the market than a new venture that is not a licensee in early stage of its development. The 
higher the number of years until the first sale, could be one of the main cause for the lower survival 
probabilities.  
This research could add enrichment to the literature in the following ways. First, we aim at 
disentangling the concept of inward licensing in the new ventures’ context, enriching our 
understanding of the variables that compose a new venture’s boundaries and a new venture’s 
technology strategy. Second, whereas a number of previous articles have examined the effect 
exerted by owner, firm, and industry characteristic on firm’ s survival, we consider the initial 
technology strategy choice a factor that could affecting the likelihood of survive. Therefore, we 
could add augmentation to new ventures growth literature by adding elements that are responsible 
for new born firms’ success or failure. Third, we could give our contribution to the literature about 
the way in which a new venture starts accumulating resources (Maritan & Peteraf, 2011). A major 
challenge for entrepreneurs is to decide how best to accumulate resources required for exploiting 
their opportunity. Early resource choices have significant impact on survival and growth of new 
ventures (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Exploring the consequences of choosing an inward licensing 
strategy as a tool to increment initial resource stock in the founding year is a trigger issues. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: in the next section we present the theoretical 
background and hypotheses. Then, our data and method are presented. Next, we present and discuss 
the empirical results. Finally, we make discussion regarding some theoretical and managerial 
implications based on our findings. The limitations of this study will also be addressed to guide 
future research directions.  
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
New companies have to deal with the liability of newness and smallness, which often result in a 
resource shortfall.  
In a seminal paper on the origins and role of new organizations, Stinchcombe (1965) argued, as a 
general rule, that young organizations have a higher propensity to die than old organizations. The 
majority of existing studies on ﬁrm survival shares the liability of smallness notion, according to 
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which the probability of survival is positively determined by new venture size at entry (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983; Aldrich and Auster,1986). Indeed, several 
scholars (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Carroll and Hannan, 1983) have recounted that the 
size of an organization influences its likelihood of survival and, subsequently, the mortality rate 
fades with increased size.  
The liability of smallness originates from the conviction that the motives why small firms do not act 
as well as large firms and experience higher failure rates are due to difficulties in gathering capital, 
attracting, selecting highly skillful workers (Aldrich and Auster, 1986), and legitimacy problems 
with external stakeholders (Baum and Oliver, 1996). Differently, large firms have a lower degree of 
reliability on external resources (Baum and Oliver, 1996), and higher number of opportunities to 
access to market power than small firms. 
 
Smallness is often coupled with newness. Freeman et al. (1983) found that increased size reduces 
the liability of smallness but that there is still liability of newness when they control size. They 
deduce that size cannot remove alone the problems deriving from liability of newness. Therefore, 
the effect of smallness and newness have both an impact on performance, but the effect of newness 
is usually stronger  (Freeman et al., 1983).  Some of the motives provided by Stinchcombe (1965) 
in giving an explanation of the liability of newness are the succeeding: new ventures are pendent on 
new roles and tasks that have to be assimilated at some costs; social interplays and a regular 
normative basis or informal information structure may be absent; solid links to clients, supporters 
are not yet installed when an organization begins to establish its activity (Freeman et al., 1983; 
Bruderl and Schussler, 1990).    
 
Liabilities of newness is principally associated to the difficulties that young firms encounter in 
acquiring resources, capital stock, authority, and legitimacy. New organizations typically are 
characterized by  limited access to capital, material, and labor markets. Lack of resources confines 
the amount of power that an organization can exercise over market and competitive conditions. 
Legitimacy for the a new venture is restricted because it had no time to demonstrate success and has 
had no time to establish stable and solid exchange relationships (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). As 
Zahra (1996) states, it is not possible for a new firm to compensate for its resource shortage, 
internally, that  may be overcome by drawing on external sources. The constraints and the liabilities 
new ventures experience in accumulating and assembling resources and capabilities, the limited 
manager’s capacity to develop all the skills needed and quickly commercialize their technologies, 
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inexperience, limited resources, rapid technological out of fashion and perpetually alternating 
market status quo often would foster them to license other companies’ technologies (Zahra, 2005). 
Inward licensing agreement is defined as a contractual arrangement whereby one firm, a licensee, 
has the freedom to take advantage of the licensed technology, typically in the form of patents, 
trademarks and manufacturing, marketing and technical expertise, developed by another 
organization, a licensor (Atuahene-Gima,1993). In most cases, the licensor will still maintain the 
ownership of the licensed technology, while the licensee needs to pay a lump sum and/or royalty 
based on the sale of a product to compensate the licensor's investment in technology (Arora et 
al.,2001). The lack of cooperation between licensor and licensee and the willingness to reach 
different objectives are the main factors that distinguish a licensing agreement from other type of 
strategic alliances, defined as defined as “cooperative agreements of any form aimed at the 
development, manufacture, and/or distribution of new products” (Zollo et al., 2002:701). Namely, a 
licensing agreement is different from a strategic alliances mainly because it does not entail 
collaboration between the parties involves. As a consequence, the licensor may impose restrictions 
on use or areas of the technological asset licensed.  
The use of inward licensing has strategic benefits, such as avoiding the high costs of internal 
development , achieving fast growth (Capon and Glazer, 1987), and even gaining access to state of 
the art technology. Inward licensing can help newly established ventures to make an improvement 
of their products (Kotabe et al., 1996); to beat failings and deficiencies in their product designs, 
manufacturing and marketing skills (Killing, 1977); to compose corresponding technologies 
essential to commercialize their innovations (Zahra, 1996) and consequently the skills necessary for 
speedy product commercialization (Teece, 1986). Licensing gives young firms, characterized by 
several constraints, access to other companies’ capabilities, instead of investing in ambiguous and 
undetermined R&D that may not reproduce these capabilities (Atuahene- Gima, 1993; Roberts and 
Berry, 1984). That is to say, it empowers new ventures to evade costly investments in technologies 
with uncertain futures and, instead, converge on those activities that differentiate their products 
from those of their rivals (Zahra et al., 2005). In such way, by inward technology licensing, the firm 
may pile up its technological knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and fortify its technical 
capability from the search and use of external technology (Chatterji, 1996) and then it accomplishes 
considerable performance through product or process innovation. 
 
These reasoning, elaborated following the conventional literature on the benefits of inward 
licensing, lead us to state that: 
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H1. Inward licensing is positively related to licensee’s speed to market.  
 
 
By relying on a technology acquired through a licensing agreement, new born firms can get access 
to technological assets externally developed, but gaining this access through a licensing agreement 
does not automatically ensure that a firm can successfully deploy the technology in the market and 
consequently perform better. The downsides that a new venture has to face when decide to be 
involved in a licensing agreement as licensee in its founding year are several and they could 
negatively impact market performance rate and subsequently survival probabilities.   
Inward licensing may lead to benefits. These benefits must be evaluated on the basis of the 
additional costs, risks and uncertainties that a licensing-in decision invariably will give rise to.  
Indeed, there are also pains involved in drawing on inward licensing strategy (Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010). 
These drawbacks could be more pertinent for a new venture than for an established firm: new born 
firms grapple with several impediments when they want to gain avail from external knowledge, 
such as limited absorptive capacity, lack of joint research experience (Van Gils and Zwart, 2004), 
lack of a structured R&D process.  
Moreover, to fully draw upon the external sources and capitalise on their opportunities, a firm rests 
with its organizational and managerial resources and competences (Almeida et al., 2003), on its 
extant knowledge base, on its prior experience with external partners (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), 
but, as stated before, a newly established firm is severely constrained by a shortage of internal 
resources and competencies, by inexperience, by limited knowledge base. Therefore, the liabilities 
of newness, the resource, financial, organizational constraints, experiential biases of which a new 
venture suffers, are a double-edged sword. On one hand, due to these aspects, a young firm is 
forced to rely on external sources, on the other, these constraints represent the conditions under 
which the benefits provided by external sources could be partially suppressed. 
 
Since resource- based view and knowledge-based view arguments imply that whether inward 
technology licensing benefits or hurts a firm’s performance depends not only on gaining access to a 
technology, but also on whether a firm can integrate externally sourced technology with internal 
processes, we focus on the factors that could be an obstacle in integrating the external knowledge 
and in leveraging it in the marketplace.  
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As main factor, we highlight the role played by absorptive capacity.  Although the construct of 
absorptive capacity  has been given considerable academic attention over the past 20 years (Lane et 
al., 2006; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008), few scholars have examined  it in the context of small and 
medium enterprises (Liao et al., 2003; Gray, 2006; Muscio, 2007; Zahra et al., 2009) and even less 
in the setting of newly established firms (Deeds, 2001; Hayton and Zahra, 2005). 
It is widely endorsed that absorptive capacity evolves cumulatively, is path-dependent, and builds 
on extant knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), 
established organizations are inclined to have assembled a large knowledge base, which improve a 
company’s capacity to absorb knowledge, but a new venture, by definition,  cannot take advantage 
of these elements. Moreover, on account of the fact that  absorptive capacity is expanding over time 
through R&D investments and new ventures lack a well-structured and developed R&D units, 
younger companies by nature, possess a lower degree of absorptive capacity than their older 
counterparts. Whereupon, they are not able to take advantages of the gathered knowledge as 
efficiently and easily as incumbents. A recent study by Luo and Deng (2009) infers that older firms 
have more absorptive capacity and thus, can learn from their strategic partners how to be more 
competent. On the opposite side, a new born firm has less absorptive capacity and thus it cannot 
learn from its external partners in an efficient manner.  
Following Flatten et al. (2011), we take into account the multi-dimensionality of the absorptive 
capacity construct, make a distinction between four stages: acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
and exploitation (Zahra and George, 2002). According to Lewin et al. (2011), the absorptive 
capacity ability mostly depends on internal and external routines, thus routines are decisive 
constituents for all absorptive capacity process steps. The first step, acquisition, pertains to the 
identification and acquisition of new external information relevant to a company’s operations. 
Assimilation, the second process step, stands for  the incorporation, adaptation  and transformation 
of the acquired information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). During the third process step, conversion, 
current knowledge base and new knowledge are merged. The last process step, exploitation, is 
related to the appliance of knowledge to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). The four 
steps employs implicitly  that the licensee is equipped by well-structured system of routines but a 
new venture, that decide to be a licensee in its early year of existence, has not had enough time to 
build the required routines and capabilities that facilitate the conversion and internalization of 
knowledge (Zahra and George, 2002). Not only firm’s routines and firm’s ability to intensify and 
improve the  routines that make possible the firm to add new knowledge into its operations (Lewin 
et al., 2011) impinge on absorptive capacity construct, but also prior investment and prior 
knowledge bear on these steps (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002). Due to their 
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nearly short company history, young companies lack prior investment and prior knowledge, as well 
as experience in searching for the right partners: indeed, they are not yet entirely familiar with the 
market circumstances and with the players operating in it. Since they have not yet had the chance to 
build up a company reputation, the arrangement and development of relationships with third parties 
turns out to be fairly demanding (Gruber, 2004). Hence, the search for the right partners and the 
identification of partner’s value is very time- and cost-consuming (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). All 
these elements negatively influence the four steps. To combine the licensed technology with 
standing business processes, a new venture should elaborate and handle all dimensions of 
absorptive capacity simultaneously (Zahra and George, 2002). This task is complicated to be 
achieved by a new venture that is characterized by lacks of routines, organizational structure, 
limited organizational members’ capabilities, not well developed knowledge base.  
Another issues to be considered is that the inward licensing allows the transferring of knowledge 
that is difficult to be codified, because tacit. 
Taking into account that there is often information in the licensor’s control that is essential for the 
licensee to effectively practice the whole technology but not fully covered by the licensed 
technology, inward technology licensing may result in licensee dependence on the licensor for 
improvements and new developments of the licensed technology. Such dependency has the 
potential to interfere with the internal skills and capabilities development of the licensee. Although 
a licensee will attain some knowledge about a licensor’s activities, most learning that takes place 
about these activities will be indirect and incomplete, through observation rather than hand-operated  
involvement (Zollo and Singh, 2004). Since the knowledge to be exchanged is many times partly 
inarticulate in part because the knowledge is largely based on empirical observation and experience, 
rather than understood through general principle (Arora and Gambardella, 2010), the notion of 
partial learning is originated in work by scholars such as Pavitt (1998) that discern between 
activities dedicated to the understanding (knowledge of technology) and activities dedicated to the 
practical applications of the technology to products. For that reason, licensees do not execute the 
tasks linked to the development of  technologies incorporated in the licensed products. In turn, 
organizational separation between licensor and licensee restricts the introduction of licensees to the 
scientific and technological knowledge underpinning the independent operations in the domain. 
Henceforward, in-depth comprehension of the licensed technology is likely to be incomplete and 
partial. A new venture will be in difficult in codifying and systematizing it since it has not an 
enough extended knowledge base, still no well-developed competencies and skills. 
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The hurdles arising in transferring the tacit part of knowledge are even more challenging in the case 
of technologies licensed at an embryonic stage.  As a general matter, when a technology is licensed, 
it is transferred at a particular point in time. When this point in time corresponds to first stages of 
development of the technology subject of licensing agreement, the potential applications or likely 
success of the technology are more uncertain and the technologies licensed requires much more 
effort in internal R&D and much more experimentation in trials.  
Early stage technologies pose extra demanding tasks for licensees:  they entail greater uncertainties, 
this will worsen the transactional issues licensees have about committing toward the licensor’s 
technology. Because they are underdeveloped, early stage technologies require more time to 
dedicate to experiments and trials, which licensees would be urged rushed to do without 
determinative assistance from the licensor. Licensees may to a greater extent be subject to licensor 
on ex post support and cooperation for commercial success (Jensen and Thursby, 2001).  
Furthermore, as we stated before, when a firm licenses-in a technology asset, the licensor may 
inflict limitation on its application  in some areas as trading, procurement of raw materials, 
expenditures, production borders. The most frequent kind of restrictions are territorial and related to 
the field of use. The license should describe the physical/geographic places in the world in which 
the licensee may use the rights granted in the license. The territory may be very large or very small, 
but it should nonetheless be explicitly stated to avoid disputes over potentially valuable markets. In 
addition to the territory restrictions, technology licenses may contain field of use restrictions that 
limit the licensee’s practice of the technology within certain defined fields of use or applications. 
Additionally, inward technology acquisition may comprise transactional costs and hazards such as 
costly and lengthy agreement. Disputes about issues such as payment, services transferred, quantity 
and quality of the technology and delivery have been reported by licensees as recurring problems in 
their relationships with licensors. These problems may make the assimilation and exploitation of the 
acquired technology a slow and costly process. Necessary investments in specialized assets to 
develop the new technology exposes the new venture face cash constraints that limit their 
bargaining power. 
 
Following these assumptions, we can therefore declare that 
 
H1a. Inward licensing is negatively related to licensee’s speed to market.  
 
Generally though, shortened time to market, or high speed to market, is acknowledged to be 
connected with higher probabilities of survival and with lowered costs. Getting products to market 
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quickly allows firms to reduce costs through experience effects (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996), it 
allows for the inclusion of the most up-to-date components possible from technology markets, 
meaning that products will be more prevailing and thus be recognized as being of higher quality 
(Kessler and Bierly, 2002). Also, having a shorter development cycle allows for more recent 
customer feedback to be considered, allowing for greater customer responsiveness and adding to 
customers’ perceptions of quality (Brucks, Zeithaml, and Naylor, 2000). Furthermore, being the 
first to market consents to firms to root industry standards and set pricing prospects, thus reaching 
higher margins, customer fidelity, well- established and durable marketplace positioning, and a 
reputation as a leader (Calantone et al., 2003; Carbonell et al, 2004; Kessler and Bierly, 2002). 
Reduced speed to market leaves for an extended period of product sales, and time to develop 
efficiencies in manufacturing (Chen et al., 2005). Products that are late to market have been shown 
to have considerably lower profits (Carbonell et al, 2004). Even preferred goods can only 
infrequently overcome the harm to profitability brought by product procrastination or retardation 
(Menon et al., 2002). Beyond the harm to profitability, product dalliance has also been viewed as 
the cause of the important decrease in the market value of the firm (Hendricks and Singhal, 1997). 
For all these reasons, a longer time to market leads to a lower probabilities of survival.  
A relevant argument to be added is the one posited by Batterink (2009): licensing-in appears to be a 
beneficial way to acquire external knowledge, but the competitive advantage of licensing-in seems 
to be temporary and transitory, probably because the graded and regulated knowledge or technology 
is accessible and ready on the market, and thus also available to competitors. 
 
Combining these aspects, we state that 
 
H2. Licensees have a lower survival’s rate than non- licensees.   
 
 
DATA AND METHOD  
This section presents the empirical setting and data, the matching procedure, the variables and 
measures used in the analysis, and the econometric technique employed.  
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Data 
Empirically, we only consider patent license agreements because they function as channels for 
knowledge propagation (Shapiro, 1985), thereby guaranteeing a minimum transfer and 
promulgation of knowledge from licensor to licensee. To demonstrate our hypotheses, we draw data 
from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). The KFS is the most extensive longitudinal study of new 
ventures in the world. The KFS public version comprehend data over the 2004–2011 interval of 
time on 4,928 firms that began operations in 2004 and this panel has been created by using an 
arbitrary sample of new businesses. KFS, coupled with Mathematica Policy research (MPR) 
developed questions on business characteristics, strategy and innovation, business structure and 
benefits, financing, and demographics of the principals, using a number of previous business 
surveys. An arbitrary sample of 32,469 businesses was disseminated for data collection on the 
Baseline Survey, which was carried during the period between July 2005 and July 2006. The 
research team made entire surveys with active owners of 4,928 businesses that established 
operations in 2004, which reflects a 43 percent response rate. A self-administered Web survey and 
Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) were made use of in order to collect data, and 
KFS interviewers were recompensed by $50 at the end of each interview. CATI completes 
accounted for 3,781 (77 percent) and Web completes accounted for 1,147 (23 percent) of the 
interviews.  
The sample is traced periodically each year and frames a wide set of specific questions that screen a 
25  range of topics such as the background of the founders, the sources and amounts of financing, 
firm strategies and innovations, the outcomes (such as sales, profits, and survival), the business start 
and the presence of formal legal status. 
Since we have at our disposal the confidential version, we can rely on data from 2004 to 2011 and 
more detail industry codes, geographical codes (zip code, metropolitan statistical area, and state), 
and many additional continuous variables (in addition to categorical variables). The KFS 
oversampled the high-technology businesses based on the intensity of employment in research and 
development in the businesses’ primary industries.   
 
To test our hypotheses, we selected from the broader sample of Kauffman Firm Database 
companies the small subset of companies which declare to adopt an inward licensing strategy in 
their first year of existence. More precisely, the question, inherited to licensing activities,  asked to 
newly established firms at their founding year  is: “In calendar year 2004, did [NAME BUSINESS] 
license in any patents?”. Operating in this way, we were able to identify 135 companies declaring to 
undertake an inward licensing in founding year. After having created the group of 135 licensees, we 
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have relied on a propensity score matching procedure in order to create the control group composed 
by comparable firms that are not licensees in their first year of existence. The matching has been 
validated for 130 firms out 135 licensees. Therefore, our final sample includes 130 new ventures 
licensees and 130 new ventures non-licensees at their founding year.  
 
Matching procedure 
The matching procedure identifies a substantial number of potential matches for each licensee.  
We created a control sample of comparable non-licensees in order to investigate whether our 
sample of licensees have had higher or lower prospects of survival than they had not licensed-in. 
We applied propensity score matching and exact matching procedures to obtain this comparable 
matched sample. The propensity score matching technique is based on the likelihood that an 
observation would be a licensee conditional on observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984). 
We used logit regression specification to estimate the conditional probabilities of being a licensee 
and allowed non-licensees to be matched with a licensee, running the procedure with the one to one 
matching.  
Since matching procedures tend to be invalidated if there are too many regressors (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002), we employed a limited number of variables on which match the two samples. We, 
hence, aimed to obtain a control sample of non-licensees with the same initial conditions of the 
licensees. Specifically, we employed number of employees, industry, the  business origin, the years 
of founder’s experience in the industry in which the firm competes, the financing method (debt vs 
equity). The variables on which we made the matching are at the founding year, 2004.  
Therefore, our sample is the sum of the treatment group, composed by 130 new ventures that decide 
to be a licensee in the first year of their lives and the control group, composed by 130 new ventures 
that do not be a licensees in their first year of existence. 
 
 
Independent Variable 
Licensing-in activities are provided in the form of binary information and measured in the KFS 
database as a dummy variable. The question asked to newly established firms at their founding year  
is: “In calendar year 2004, did [NAME BUSINESS] license in any patents?” We create a cohort of 
firms that at inception decide to acquire from external sources a patent through a licensing 
agreement. The independent variable is labelled as LIC-IN. 
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Dependent Variable  
In the first hypothesis, we would like to test the effect of acquiring a patent in the first year of life 
through an inward licensing strategy on speed to market. To construct this variable we rely on the 
answer to the following question: “Did [NAME BUSINESS] have any sales or customers?” Then, 
we count the number of years used to reach the market for the first time. Operating in this way, we 
create the measure for the speed to market, labelled as Speed to market. 
For the second hypothesis, the dependent variable is built on the following question: “What is the 
main reason [NAME BUSINESS] is out of business?”. The variable Failure takes 1 if the firm is 
sold to another business or merged with another business (outcome 1), 2 if the firm stopped its 
operations temporarily or permanently (outcome 2). Hence, we introduce a distinction between 
voluntary firm closure in the form of merger or acquisition and compulsory firm closure in the form 
of failure/permanently closed operations. A firm that “disappears” due to a merger or acquisition is 
more likely to be a successful firm, or at least one that still has value and potential in the 
marketplace. In contrast, a firm that permanently closes operations is one where there is a mismatch 
between the resources and capabilities for the firm and owner and the opportunities available in the 
marketplace.  
 
 
Control Variable  
In each of our model specification we control for the matched variables: 
Firm size measured as the sum of employees (EMPLOYEES). 
 
As previously suggested by Mata et al. (1995), initial size has continuing and enduring positive 
influences on survival later in the life of the firm. Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) pointed out that 
size can impact survival positively. The question related to the firm size is the following: “Not 
counting owner(s), on December 31, 2004, how many people worked for [NAME BUSINESS]?” 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Experience measured as the number of years of  experience the owner has in the 
same industry in which the firm competes (EXPERIENCE).  
Several studies have found that a firm’s pre-entry knowledge and experience improve its long-run 
performance and survival (Dencker et al., 2009) 
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Organizations need a certain level of technological knowledge before they can benefit from 
technologies discovered by other firms. Specifically, organizations need a certain level of  
technological knowledge before they can benefit from indirect learning. For a new venture, its prior 
knowledge corresponds to its founder’s knowledge and founder’s experience. The role of 
entrepreneurial experience is important in order to increase the absorptive capacity of the new 
venture, namely existing stocks of knowledge facilitate the accumulation and integration of new 
knowledge, shape a firm’s ability to comprehend and apply new information, and shape its reactions 
to new situations, to reduce the casual ambiguity about the factors that lead to a superior 
performance and to overcome the experiential constraints a new venture suffers from. The question 
related to the entrepreneurial experience is the following: “How many other new businesses 
(have/has) (you/[OWNER B-J]) started besides [NAME BUSINESS]?” 
 
Industries controls. We use 2 digit NAICS code to identify the sector in which new ventures 
operate (INDUSTRY). We created 7 categories according to the definitions of each industry  
provided  by  Naics: 1) utilities and construction; 2) manufacturing; 3) trade; 4) transportation and 
warehousing; 5) business support services: 6) social services; 7) other. 
Audretsch (1991) considers the influence of industrial variables on survival and  detected that 
survival rates differ across industries. Audretsch indicates that industry’s specific technical 
surroundings as well as industry’s demand are important determinants of survival rates. The 
question related to declaration of industry is the following: “As of December 31, 2004, our records 
indicate the principal activity of the business was [D&B NAICS CODE DESCRIPTION]. Is that 
correct?” 
 
Financing Method. We control for the sourcing of financing and measured this variable using the 
total ranges of equity and trade (DEBT-EQUITY).  
 
Empirical evidences report that higher debt decreases the probability of survival. Huynh et al. 
(2009) found that firms with high level of leverage (debt to value ratio measured debt over assets) 
face an increasing failure risk with an increase in leverage. Huynh et al. (2008) find that the higher 
the debt to asset ratio is at initial stage, the lower the life expectancy of the firm. The likelihood of 
survival is diminishing with leverage and it seems that debt is a negative driving force to survival.   
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The question related to the amount of debt and equity is the following: “ range of Total Debts from 
owners and from other business”; “ range of Total Equity from owners and from non-owners” 
 
Firm Origin. We control for some descriptions of how a business can get started (ORIGIN). 
According to the way in which new ventures are founded, they differ  in their capacity to gain and 
assemble resources in building matchless organizational capabilities (Miller & Camp, 1985) that 
can result in performance dissimilarities (Shrader & Simon, 1997; Zahra, 1996).  The question 
related to the way in which a new venture has been established is: “Which of the following best 
describes how [NAME BUSINESS] was started. Was it  
1. A new business, branch or subsidiary owned by an existing business 
2. A business inherited from someone else 
3.  A new, independent business created by a single person or a team of people 
4. The purchase of an existing business 
5. The purchase of a franchise 
6. An organization designed for social and charitable objectives and legally established as 
“not-for-profit” 
7.  the business started some other way? (SPECIFY)”  
 
Research and Development. We measure for internal R&D as expenditures in research and 
development (R&D). To enhance its performance, and consequently its probabilities of survival, a 
new venture licensee has not only have the ability to acquire and assimilate external knowledge, but 
also has to exploit the new knowledge translating it into products and processes (Murray and 
Peyrefitte, 2007). It has been stated that not only firm’s internal efforts create new knowledge, but 
they also encourage the use of external knowledge sources and  increase the firm’s ability to take 
advantages of these sources. Thus, the most relevant the firm’s internal capabilities, the most 
relevant are the contributions of external knowledge acquisition strategies on firm’s performance.  
The question related to the R&D activities is: “Did [NAME BUSINESS] spend any money on 
research and development of new products and services during calendar year 2004?” 
 
 
Econometric technique 
In our first hypothesis, our dependent variable is the speed to market, measured by the number of 
years used by the new venture licensee to get the market for the first time.  
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Given that we measure the time to market as the number of years taken by the firm until its firs sale, 
our dependent variable is a count variable. The model used to conduct the empirical analysis had to 
appropriately accommodate non-negative integer count values. Moreover, prior studies have 
indicated that modeling count variables requires using a regression approach that deals with many 
zeros (Sampson, 2007; Ziedonis, 2004). We considered as first step the option of using a Poisson 
model as it is one of the simplest choices in dealing with count data (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 
1984). However, the Poisson distribution is based on the main assumption that the variance is 
proportional to the mean,            . If this assumption is not respected, the coefficients 
will be estimated consistently, but underestimated standard errors might be shown counterfeit  
significance levels (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986). The test for overdispersion provided evidence 
against using a Poisson model and in favor of a model that allows the variance of the dependent 
variable to exceed its mean.  
In our case, the data are not over- dispersed: the mean (1.2) is close to the variance (0.55). The 
appropriateness of Poisson model is also witnessed by the poisgof command: a significant (p<0.05) 
test statistic from the gof indicates that the Poisson model is inappropriate. In our case, the gof test 
is not significant (p-value=1.000). We run the analysis one more time, this time using negative 
binomial regression. The likelihood ratio test in the negative binomial regression controls for the 
overdispersion. When the overdispersion parameter is zero the negative binomial distribution is 
equivalent to a Poisson distribution. In our case, alpha is not significantly different from zero (chi= 
0.00) and thus reinforces one last time that the Poisson distribution is appropriate. 
In conclusion, as indicated by econometric tests, run to check for the most appropriate model 
between Poisson and negative binomial distribution, we use the Poisson model in order to validate 
our first hypothesis.  
To demonstrate our second hypothesis, we use duration (survival) analysis. Survival analysis is a 
collection of methods for analyzing time-to-event data. Time-to-event data reflect the observation 
of the time from a specified time origin (new venture’s founding year) to a particular endpoint, a 
certain event of interest (exiting). The Kauffman Firm Survey data procure us with records of the 
event of interest (firm exiting), as well as the type of event measured from a specified time origin, 
voluntary or compulsory closure. In our sample, the endpoint consists of two mutually exclusive 
events of interest, voluntary or compulsory closure, that create a competing risks situation.  
In addition to the explanation of the reason why we are using a competing risk model, we have to 
pay attention to the fact that our dependent variable in the second hypothesis is associated with a set 
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of explanatory factors: it takes 2 values (1 if the firm voluntary stopped operations, 2 if the closure 
is compulsory). We have also used the option "base" to indicate the category we would want to use 
for the baseline comparison group. 
In sum, since our dependent variable, in the second hypothesis, assumes more than one value, we 
have to use a multi-category response model, a model that is suitable for examining the lifetime 
outcomes in which a firm is at risk to more than one event  type. Hence, to analyze our duration 
data, the most appropriate model to be run is the multinomial logit.  
In sum, for each firm, we observe the time-to-event and the type of event. In addition, the 
occurrence of one type of event removes the business from risk of the other event types, i.e. 
businesses that close are not at risk of being a target for a merger or acquisition. The KFS provides 
us with the year in which the firm went out of business. Thus, our measurement of event time is 
discrete, because the survey data are provided on a yearly basis and therefore the duration lengths 
are positive integers. The hazard function is a time to failure function that gives the instantaneous 
probability of the failure, given that it has not yet occurred. 
 
 
RESULTS  
Validating the matching procedure 
Before starting the analysis, we confirmed that our matching procedure provided comparable 
licensees and non-licensees. We ran t-tests across all variables and a logistic regression to explain 
the likelihood of having signed a license agreement in the first year  given the conditional variables 
used in the matching procedure. Table 2.2.1 reports the results. Given that the matching variables 
are considered appropriate, we can conclude that the matching procedure is successful in terms of 
providing comparable non-licensees for the analysis of sales and survival. These results, however, 
also indicate the need to include these as controls in the analysis 
 
[Insert Table 2.2.1. Here] 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Among the 260 firms studied, 5-6 years is the longest period to reach the market and exclusively 
some of new ventures that decide to be a licensee in their first year of existence take 5-6 years to 
reach the market. The higher number of years taken by a no-licensee to get to the market is 3 years, 
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and the majority of them takes just 1 year. The majority of licensee take 1 year but as said some of 
them entail 5 or 6 year to the first sale. These results show that licensees take more year to get the 
register a first sale. The t-test is positively significant (p-value 0.000). 
Furthermore, we find that the licensees are usually established by an higher number of individuals 
than their non-licensees counterparts. The difference in the number of owners between licensees 
and non-licensees is statistically significant: on average, 6 owners for licensees and 3 for non-
licensees. Another statistically significant difference between the two groups of our sample is 
related to the number of employees dedicates to R&D activities: the licensees exhibit higher number 
of employees in R&D than non-licensees. Interesting is the result about the propensity to in-license 
not only patents but also copyrights and trademarks: the licensees in our sample are more inclined 
in acquire also copyrights and trademarks compared to their corresponding non-licensees. It is even 
more important to notice that there is no statistically significant difference in licensing-out patents, 
copyrights and trademark among the firms composing our sample.  
Table 2.2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory and control variables, and the 
associated Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
[Insert Table 2.2.2 Here] 
 
Running t-test for the probability of survival, the majority of no-licensee still operate in the market 
and the number of licensees that fail is higher than the number of no-licensees that fail, as suggested 
by the statistical significance of t-test. Before proceeding to survival analysis, we look at the 
Kaplan-Meier curves for all the categorical predictors. This will provide insight into the shape of 
the survival function for each group and give an idea of whether or not the groups are proportional.  
The group treatment 0 is composed by those firms that are not licensees, while treatment 1 
corresponds to licensees sample.  
 
[Insert FIGURE 2.2.3. Here] 
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Table 2.2.4. presents the results of the Poisson regression used to test HY1 and HY1a and the 
multinomial logit to test failure time regressions (HY2). Models I–II investigate the speed to 
market, measured as number of years required for licensees and non-licensees to reach the market 
until the first sale, considering the control variables only (Model I), including the licensee dummy 
(Model II). Models III–IV indicate the failure hazard rate for licensees and non-licensees, 
considering the control variables only (Model I), including the licensee dummy (Model II). 
Outcome 2 corresponds to the case in which the closure is compulsory: the firm stopped its 
operations temporarily or permanently. 
The licensee variable in Model II exhibits negative estimates significant, suggesting that new 
venture licensee take an higher number of years until its first sale than non-licensees. This supports 
Hy1a and consequently Hy1 is not validated by econometric results.  
Hypothesis 2 also finds support in Model IV. Model V E VI indicate the hazard rate of voluntary 
closed operations for licensees and non-licensees, considering the control variables only (Model V), 
including the licensee dummy (Model VI).  Voluntary closed operations corresponds to the case in 
which the firm is sold to another business or merged with another business: outcome 1. All the 
models exhibit significant chi-square values, which suggests validity. 
We also added the dummy for each year: year dummies should work as year fixed effects. They are 
important to reduce concerns that the effect that we observe are due to period effects.  
 
[Insert Table 2.2.4 here] 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
To confirm also our assumption according to which the implementation of a licensing-in strategy at 
founding years lead to a longer process until the first sale, we rely on the following question: “Did 
[NAME BUSINESS] have any customers or sales in calendar year 2004?”. We check for the 
answer to this questions for all the years of observations. In so doing, we investigate as much as we 
can, the long term new ventures licensee and non-licensee performance. Since we are dealing with a 
dummy variables, we use both the probit and the logit model to test whether there is difference in 
the sales gained by the new ventures. For all the analysed years, the regression analysis show a 
coefficient negatively and strongly statistically significant (p-value less significant is equal to 0.03). 
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This result validates our assumption on the relationship between having sale and being involved in a 
licensing agreement: new ventures licensees have constantly over the 8 years of observation, from 
2004 to 2011, less sale than their non-licensees counterparts.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper addresses the inward licensing phenomenon from the new venture licensee’s viewpoint, 
investigating whether licensing-in of technologies enables the licensees to have a higher or lower 
probabilities of survival than non-licensees. The survival rates are directly connected to the time 
taken by firms to reach the market. Following the conventional literature on licensing, we should 
expect that a new venture, that decide to be part of a licensing agreement as licensee in its founding 
year, has a higher life expectancy than a non-licensee. Counter intuitively, we hypothesize that a 
new venture licensee, that acquire a patent in its first year of existence, has lower likelihood to 
operate in the market longer than its non-licensee counterparts.  
Based on a model that includes matched samples of licensees and non-licensees, we find support for 
the hypotheses that licensees survive less than their non-licensee counterparts. The results suggest 
that licensing-in involves not only gains but also pains. This is particularly true for new ventures. 
Although the compelling effect of inward licensing on new product development is widely 
recognized, we warn that this possible positive effect should not be taken for granted if we are 
working in the new venture’s context. 
Even if technology in-licensing is acknowledged to be for new ventures licensee a fundamental  
way of entrance in technological learning (Johnson 2002; Lin 2003; Tsai and Wang 2009), our 
findings suggest that inward licensing strategy is not a winning strategy for a newly established firm 
that decide to implement this strategy in first year of its existence. We started by asking whether the 
decision to implement an inward licensing strategy by a new venture in its first year of existence 
has a positive or negative impact on survival. We expect, differently from what the literature is used 
to state, a negative impact of being licensee on survival probabilities, as a consequence  of speed to 
market: new ventures  that used inward licensing at founding year, achieved later the market than 
the new ventures that do not used inward licensing at founding year. The results support this 
prediction.  
The study suggests that new ventures, that decide to be licensees at their inception, have lower 
probabilities to survive than their non-licensees counterparts. We choose to analyse the 
consequences of  the implementation of inward licensing strategy in a new venture’s first year of 
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existence because we know from prior work that a firm’s  founding conditions have long lasting 
effects on its survival and growth (Mata et al. 1995, Audretsch and Mahmood 1994, Huynh et al. 
2008, Geroski et al. 2010).  
The present study therefore advances the ongoing discussion on the factors impacting new venture 
survival, as well as the more specific stream of research on the role of  inward licensing in new 
venture’s context. A number of articles examine the effect of owner characteristics and attributes to 
find that certain qualities and capabilities increase the likelihood of firm survival. These capabilities 
can be grouped into the categories of human, social, and financial capital. The majority these 
studies are in accord with the resource-based view of the firm which is still debating about that the 
assignment of the entrepreneur is to gain and make efficient use of  resources that will provide an 
advantage over its rivals and higher probabilities of survival(Brush et al., 2001). A tool that an 
entrepreneur can use in  acquiring an external resource is inward licensing strategy, overlook the 
downsides that this choice could have on its market performance and subsequently on its survival 
rate. New ventures have both limited resources and numerous investments needs including R&D, 
organizational building, market development. Therefore, the allocation of their limited resources is 
a critical decision an entrepreneur makes.  
Our study tries to be inserted in this stream of literature, adding another reason why a new venture 
could stop its operation, a wrong initial technology strategy.  
Moreover, in line with Aspelund et al. (2005), we suggest  that considerable research effort should 
be focused on investigating antecedents and the consequences of those initial strategic and market 
decisions made by new firms. Indeed, the technological strategy developed initially is therefore 
likely to establish a path dependency. Our study could supplement existing literature on the effects 
of new venture founding conditions.  
Arora et al. (2001) identify the urgency to identify the factor that lead to both inefficiencies and  
efficiencies in markets for technology. Therefore, the present study contributes to the markets for 
technology literature: the literature on markets for technology has not determined whether in-
licensing is a winning strategy for new ventures. We show that obtain a knowledge asset externally 
developed, through a licensing agreement, is not an appropriate initial decision for a new born firm. 
Thus, although firms may choose to in- license technologies to overwhelm entry barriers, to attain 
access to the newest technologies, the implication of this choice for speed to market and survival is 
not neutral. The managerial implication of our work is that inward licensing may provide a jump 
start in resource but the several constraints of which a new venture experiences can hinder the 
firm’s ability to integrate the external knowledge and consequently to develop the new resources 
and the internal capabilities it needs to operate effectively. Clearly, firms have incentives to 
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undertake an inward licensing strategy; nonetheless, such a strategy may inhibit the understanding 
and control that a firm needs to develop the full suite of resources required for being successful and 
fast on the market. This impacts on firm’s survival prospective (Mulotte et al., 2013).  
 
The paper has limitations related mainly to the nature of licensing agreements and patents. 
Overthrown these limitations could be reflected in developing future research directions. Since we 
have no data relatively to each licensing agreement and to the firms characteristics of the parts 
involved in the agreement, we cannot control for the similarities between the acquired patent and 
the licensee’s current knowledge base. Moreover, it would be useful to investigate cases in which 
firms do not in-license patents, but products or component technologies. Another future research 
challenge is to analyse the impact of other channels, different from licensing agreement, through 
which acquire external developed knowledge on survival. Our approach focuses on inward 
licensing in one period of time and this remains a severe limitation of the study. However, with 
future researches, it will be possible to examine whether the being a licensee, not only in the 
founding year, changes over time its impact on survival rates.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table 2.2.1. Matching procedure 
     t-test mean values   Matching model   
 No-licensees  Licensees  Estimate Std. err  
R&D 0.33 0.44  0.00 0.18  
Industry 3.6 3.7  0.03 0.00  
Origin 3.1 3.2  0.00 0.17  
Experience 15.4 13.9  0.64 0.00  
Employees 7.1 10.1  0.26 0.00  
Debt  3.6 3.6  0.85 0.02  
Equity 3.1 3.5  0.00 0.03  
_Cons     0.63 0.00  
Numb. obs    4722   
Log-Likelihood     -544.63   
Pseudo R2    0.08   
 
 
 
Table 2.2.2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficient 
Variables Mean S.D [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1] Failure 0.12 0.46 1.000          
[2]Speed to 
market 
1.2 0.74 -0.03 
1.000 
        
[3] Lic-in 0.48 0.49 0.073* 0.199* 1.000        
[4] R&D 0.38 0.48 -0.051 0.167* 0.112* 1.000       
[5]Industry 3.7 1.6 0.001 -0.083* 0.014 -0.178* 1.000      
[6] Origin 3.2 0.5 0.059* -0.059* 0.049 -0.190* 0.137* 1.000     
[7]Experience 14.7 11.4 -0.060* 0.070* -0.064* 0.047 -0.055 -0.147* 1.000    
[8]Employees 8.5 43.8 -0.027 0.020 0.033 0.072* -0.056 0.085* 0.006 1.000   
[9] Debt 3.6 3.4 -0.030 -0.028 -0.007 0.068* -0.110* 0.128* -0.018 0.113* 1.000  
[10] Equity 3.3 3.4 -0.045 0.076* 0.065* 0.230* -0.100* -0.007 0.013 0.058* 0.190* 1.000 
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Figure 2.2.3 
Failure Outcome 2: firms stopped its operations temporarily or permanently 
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Table 2.2.4. Regressions Analysis 
 MODEL I  
 
MODEL II 
Dep. 
Variable  
Speed to 
market 
MODEL III MODEL IV  
Dep. Variable  
Failure  
(Outcome 2) 
MODEL V MODEL VI  
Dep. 
Variable 
Failure 
(Outcome 1) 
Ind. Variable  
Lic-in  
  
0.197*** 
(0.0291) 
  
0.822* 
(0.372) 
  
0.211 
(0.469) 
       
Control Variables  
 
      
R&D  0.133*** 
(0.0359) 
0.119*** 
(0.0350) 
-0.354 
(0.390) 
-0.383 
(0.388) 
-0.580 
(0.538) 
-0.600 
(0.555) 
Origin 0.0260 
(0.0247) 
0.0142 
(0.0263) 
0.475 
(0.255) 
0.480 
(0.258) 
0.479 
(0.269) 
0.465 
(0.299) 
Experience 0.00188 
(0.00134) 
-0.00247 
(0.00132) 
-0.0276 
(0.0153) 
-0.0235 
(0.0162) 
0.00742 
(0.0195) 
0.00790 
(0.0196) 
Employees --0.0000 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
-0.145* 
(0.0577) 
-0.153* 
(0.0612) 
0.00138 
(0.00168) 
0.00137 
(0.0197) 
Debt -0.00835 
(0.00509) 
-0.00725 
(0.00498) 
-0.0244 
(0.0476) 
-0.0230 
(0.0481) 
-0.0287 
(0.0682) 
-0.0291 
(0.0680) 
Equity 0.0127* 
(0.00584) 
-0.0109 
(0.00565) 
-0.0971 
(0.0623) 
-0.0977 
(0.0602) 
0.149 
(0.0892) 
0.147 
(0.0877) 
Year        
0 year 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 year 0.0690 
(0.0538) 
0.0619 
(0.0527) 
0.113 
(0.556) 
0.119 
(0.559) 
0.00661 
(0.987) 
0.00146 
(0.990) 
2 year 0.0927 
(0.00556) 
0.0835 
(0.0546) 
0.704 
(0.513) 
0.692 
(0.513) 
1.330 
(0.808) 
1.316 
(0.799) 
3 year 0.150* 
(0.0607) 
0.147* 
(0.0590) 
-0.0219 
(0.626) 
0.0439 
(0.629) 
1.595 
(0.825) 
1.590 
(0.825) 
4 year 0.126* 
(0.0592) 
0.121* 
(0.0577) 
-0.289 
(0.794) 
-0.279 
(0.794) 
0.738 
(0.984) 
0.725 
(0980) 
5 year 0.184** 
(0.0635) 
0.181** 
(0.0617) 
0..381 
(0.656) 
0.414 
(0.660) 
0.911 
(1.022) 
0.907 
(1.019) 
6 year 0.165* 
(0.0656) 
0.166** 
(0.0634) 
0.0775 
(0.711) 
0.133 
(0.717) 
1.611 
(0.918) 
1.611 
(0.917) 
 
 
Industry 
      
1  0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0.167* 
(0.0665) 
0.0841 
(0.0695) 
0.612 
(0.792) 
0.306 
(0.827) 
14.00** 
(0.454) 
14.31** 
(0.480) 
3 0.0521 
(0.0639) 
0.00470 
(0.0695) 
0.546 
(0.811) 
0.398 
(0.817) 
13.63** 
(0.591) 
14.00** 
(0.588) 
4 0.185 
(0.108) 
0.108 
(0.0997) 
0.980 
(1.076) 
0.840 
(1.038) 
-0.375 
(0.427) 
-0.299 
(0.428) 
5 0.0506 
(0.0589) 
-0.0138 
(0.0636) 
0.0330 
(0.733) 
0.197 
(0.748) 
13.82** 
(0.346) 
14.18** 
(0.350) 
6 -0.0775 
(0.0686) 
-0.121 
(0.0762) 
0.358 
(1.023) 
0.220 
(1.041) 
13.91** 
(0.733) 
14.38** 
(0.735) 
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7 -0.149* 
(0.0684) 
-0.219** 
(0.0757) 
0.551 
(0.867) 
0.396 
(0.864) 
0.0592 
(0.535) 
0.136 
(0.326) 
_cons -0.0861 
(0.103) 
-0.0790 
(0.105) 
-4.130** 
(1.215) 
-4.486*** 
(1.298) 
-20.50*** 
(1.292) 
-20.86*** 
(1.284) 
N 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 
R-sq       
Adj. R-sq       
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2.3 A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LEARNING SEQUENCES ON NEW VENTURE’S 
INNOVATION: THE MODERATING EFFECT OF FOUNDER’S EXPERIENCE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We employ the capabilities literature and the organizational learning literature to shed light on 
implications of learning sequences adopted by new ventures on their innovative performance. In 
particular, we investigate the impact of two alternative initial learning paths: direct-indirect and 
indirect-direct learning respectively. We postulate that the timing at which a firm chooses to start 
learning indirectly impacts on its innovative outcomes. Consistent with Fletcher and Harris (2012), 
we choose, as tool trough which firms learn indirectly, the inward licensing strategy. Based on 
Kauffman Firm Foundation Enclave Database, we find that the new ventures that decide to rely 
later on the indirect learning process exhibit a better innovative performance than the new ventures 
that decide to learn indirectly in the first years of existence. This relationship is negatively 
moderated by prior entrepreneurial experience, in terms of industry and start-up experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: indirect learning, licensing, new ventures, innovative performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizational learning is extensively accepted as being a pivotal activity for firms, an activity that 
shapes their development, their growth, the possibility of gaining competitive advantages over their 
rivals (Kogut and Zander 1992, Grant 1996). The progressive elaboration of the process through 
which firms learn, is of particular interest not only to strategy researchers and organizational 
theorists but it is also of fundamental interest in entrepreneurial literature. Indeed, as market 
competition becomes more and more intensified, new ventures need organizational learning to 
develop and maintain better competitive positions. Organizational learning has, therefore, 
developed Into an essential tool for newly established firms to settle a competitive advantage and 
enhance performance (Senge 1990). Indeed, research suggests that it is a central tool by which firms 
generate innovations, adapt to environments, exploit the opportunities offered by new market, 
generate and maintain over time a competitive advantage (Argote, 1999). In this sense, the urgency 
to conceive and out into practice an organizational learning capability, which empowers a new 
venture to carried out adequate  management practices, routines, and courses of action that facilitate 
and promote learning, has become a priority for entrepreneurs and managers.  
 
Organizational learning is a construct that covers a multitude of aspects. It covers several fields 
such as a) the content of learning, what is learned?, b) the subject of learning, who is learning?, c) 
the incentives and aims for learning, why does learning take place?, d) and the efficiency and 
effectiveness of learning, which results does learning yield?. (Schwens et al., 2009). Many of these 
aspects have been the object of indiscriminate attention in entrepreneurship literature, but the extant 
research on organizational leaning has produced a concise and insufficient comprehension 
regarding the learning sequences and their potential impact on firm’s innovation performance. 
Despite the several enriching arguments on the importance of single direct learning trajectory (trial-
and-error learning, experimental learning, improvisational learning) and indirect learning processes 
(vicarious learning), thank to which much understanding about how firms use each of the learning 
processes alone has been provided, we notice that the studies around the learning sequences of these 
two processes and their impacts on firm’s performance persist to be underd-investigated (Bingham 
et al., 2012). Some researchers have explored the effect of using  direct and indirect learning 
together (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Schwab, 2007). The conclusive result of 
the studies indicates that, relying on both direct and indirect learning leads to an interaction in 
which the created knowledge exhibits a weaker effect than the linear addition of their independent 
effects. These studies are relevant for the suggestions they made: firms appear to make use of both 
direct and indirect learning processes and each of them may influence the other. Despite these 
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contributions, the effect of  the sequences of these two learning processes on innovation 
performance remains an unclear issue.  
 
We try to cover this gap, investigating the impact of two alternative learning sequences, adopted by 
a new venture at its initial development stage: direct-indirect and indirect-direct learning 
respectively. Consistent with Schwab (2007),  direct learning entails that a firm learns from its own 
background. The most investigated processes through which direct learning takes place are: 1) trial-
and-error learning, it occurs  when organizations change their subsequent behaviour in response to 
prior performance outcomes. (Tsang, 2002; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992); 2) experimental learning,  
it occurs when organizations obtain knowledge and insights through predetermined examinations 
that take place in controlled settings and that are clearly created to help managers to be better 
prepared for any potential and unexpected hurdles (Pisano, 1994); 3) improvisational learning, it 
occurs when organizations learn in real time as reaction and action converge to solve emergent 
problems and take advantage of surprising opportunities (Miner et al., 2001). Finally, some scholars 
focused their attention on indirect learning, learning from others’ course of actions (Ingram, 2002). 
Works in this stream of research usually sharpen on vicarious learning, which occurs as firms 
observe actions implemented by other firms and then change their own behaviour consequently 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Through vicarious learning firms thus exploit the benefits of 
gathered knowledge while escaping from the virtual costs of the accumulation of experience 
(Srinivasan et al.,2007).  
In developing our reasoning, few points should be kept in mind: 1) we analyse the two learning 
sequences at new venture’s initial stage in order to highlight how the decisions undertaken in the 
first years of development have long-lasting impacts on new venture’s performance; 2) we start 
from the assumption that the main difference between these two learning patterns is the timing at 
which a new venture decides to rely on indirect learning approach. Therefore, the research question 
around which we build the present work is:  
when is it convenient to start learning through an indirect approach? Is it better to start learning 
indirectly soon after founding or to postpone this strategy until the new venture has accumulated 
significant resources? 
In order to study learning sequences undertaken by entrepreneurial firms, we apply learning theory 
building on the works by Huber (1991).   
According to Huber (1991), the way through which acquire indirect learning are mainly two: 
vicariously and grafting. Grafting corresponds to the hiring of people or purchasing  business units 
(Huber, 1991), but the most widely accepted indirect learning process is the vicarious learning 
98 
 
(Srinivasan et al., 2007). In line with the definition provided by Fletcher and Harris (2012), we label 
indirect learning process based on vicarious model.  In vicarious knowledge acquisition, firms learn 
from the experience of others, for example by observing them in networks, or through licensing, 
strategic alliances or strategies of collaboration (Chander & Lyon, 2009; Huber, 1991; Welch & 
Welch, 1996). The case we analyse in this study is vicarious learning through licensing.  
We will try to demonstrate whether and how the age at which a firm decides to rely on indirect 
learning approach has an impact on its capacity to be innovative. In order to achieve our objective, 
we analyse a sample composed by 276 new ventures, extracted from the 4,928 firms included in the 
Kauffman Firm Database. Among them, 140 follow the indirect-direct learning path and 136 follow 
the direct-indirect learning path. Rephrasing in light of timing at which the indirect learning starts,  
140 new ventures decide to start learning indirectly in first two years of their existence  applying an 
inward licensing strategy and they are labelled as “early indirect learners”,  while 136 start rely on 
indirect learning approach, implemented an inward licensing strategy some years after their 
founding and they are labelled as “late indirect learners”.  
 
We propose that late indirect learners are more innovative than early indirect learners. This result is 
the consequence of the fact that establish initial operation in an autonomous way, relying on 
experiential and direct learning, allows the firms to build a better structured system of internal 
capabilities and better developed “learning by doing” process. Is so doing, a new venture avoids the 
risk of casual ambiguity and partial learning. We find that being a late indirect learner is positively 
associated with an increase in firm patenting activity in the years subsequent to the licensing deal. 
Furthermore, the results also confirmed the idea that startup experience is negatively correlated to 
the positive effect of licensing on innovation, while the idea that industry experience is positively 
correlated to effect of licensing on innovation is not supported.  
The aim of this research is to highlight the importance of learning sequences, and specifically the 
impact of initial learning sequences, on firms’ innovation outputs. In more details, our focus is on 
the effect exerted by age at which a firm starts learning, following an indirect pattern, on its ability 
to be innovative.   
The core contribution of the present study is revealing whether there are convenient learning 
sequences and how they differentially influence firm’s innovative implications.  Our contribution is 
to build and expand the novel stream of research on “learning sequences” (Bingham et al., 2012), as 
a meaningful focus and concept in process research on learning. Since we choose to analyse the 
inward licensing strategy as a way through which  rely on an indirect learning pattern, we could 
contribute to the licensing literature. In particular, we investigate the role of new venture as 
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licensee. We add novel insights on learning-by licensing as a relatively unexplored area in the  
literature on entrepreneurial firms.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: the first section sets up the conceptual 
framework that will provide a theory-based structure to answer our research questions and to 
develop our hypotheses. The second section presents a description of the research context, empirical 
setting, and methods used for gathering and analyzing data. The third section concludes with 
potential managerial implications that the research might have. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Reviewing the literature on organizational learning shows that the concepts of learning applied 
within the field of entrepreneurship (Harrison & Leitch, 2005) are several: the research literature 
addresses dynamic learning perspectives (Cope, 2005), the process of entrepreneurial learning, the 
nature of entrepreneurial opportunities (Dutta & Crossan, 2005), organizational learning and 
opportunity-recognition (Lumpkin & Lichtenstein, 2005), experiential learning (Corbet, 2005), and 
explorative and exploitative learning. While the weight of proactive and dynamics aspects as well 
as organizational change and enduring effects over time have been accentuated (Grant, 1996; 
Nonaka, 1994), our focus is on the evaluation of the impact of initial learning sequences on firms’ 
innovation outcomes. Huber (1991) identifies four central organizational learning dimensions or 
mechanisms: (1) knowledge acquisition, the process through which knowledge is gained; (2) 
information distribution, by which information from different sources is shared and leads to new 
combination of understanding; (3) information interpretation, in which shared information takes 
same  understood meanings and (4) organizational memory, process by which knowledge is stored 
and kept for later use. Researchers have dedicated the majority of  conceptual and theoretical 
research efforts on the first process, knowledge acquisition (Huber, 1991). Huber disengages  
knowledge acquisition into five categories: (a) experiential, or learning from experience or 
activities, with subcategories that include experimenting, self-appraisal, unsystematic or 
unintentional learning, and learning curves; (b) vicarious, or learning by observing and imitating 
other firm’s behaviour; (c) searching for information about the external organization's environment; 
(d) grafting, or adding on segments that own the essential knowledge but not owned by the firm; 
and (e) congenital, or drawing on knowledge ready at the organization's origin, such as the 
experiences accumulated by the founder and the employee from their prior activities.  
Huber’s (1991) conceptualization of forms of knowledge acquisition has been re-elaborated in a 
recent work by  Fletcher and Harris (2012). According to the authors, Huber (1991) has presented a 
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range of sources of experiential and objective knowledge for organizations. Objective knowledge, 
defined as explicit or codified, and experiential knowledge, defined as tacit or implicit, have long 
been differentiated (Fletcher and Harris, 2012). The principal discrepancy among these two kinds of 
knowledge is that the objective knowledge is readily procured through training or through 
acquisition from data sources such as market surveys, government statistics, company reports 
(Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1966), while experiential knowledge cannot easily be acquired, taught, or 
transferred. Coupled with these two types of knowledge, a distinction between internal and external 
knowledge sources has been made in recent research on knowledge sources and their implications 
for innovative outcome (Weigelt, 2009). External sources have been identified to be especially 
important for new ventures: it is apparent that new ventures lack resources and proven 
competencies. Through external sources, they can close resource and competences gaps.  
The combination and overlaying of these distinctions generate the framework illustrated in Fig. 1 
below, adopted from Fletcher and Harris (2012).  
 
FIGURE 1. 
 Internal source of Knowledge  External source of knowledge  
Experential Knowledge  Direct experience Indirect experience 
Vicarious learning and grafting  
Objective Knowledge  Internal information  External search  
 
External search: external objective knowledge 
 
Firms can acquire knowledge from objective sources by searching and scanning the most relevant 
trends about  its external environment and conducting focused search for new information (Huber, 
1991; Welch, 1996). In this category of learning are included primarily many sources of published 
marketing information (Jones & Crick, 2004). Among which, official documents produced by 
chambers of commerce, associations, consultancy firms, trade publications, and government reports 
are covered. Firms may also conduct their own market investigation, and they can undertake 
education and training to learn from others.  
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Internal information: internal objective knowledge 
 
For what concerns the internal information, it has been usually overlooked in previous research 
because it might be considered as knowledge already present within the firm. In developing this 
internal objective knowledge, the most important sources of objective information are  both internal 
staff and system. Considering that firms many times ‘do not know what they know’ (Huber, 
1991:100) and fail to keep the stored organizational memory, this type of knowledge is not entirely 
experiential, thus can be categorized as objective.  
Slater and Narver (1995) advise that managers make an effective use of internal sources in order to 
attain new knowledge about their firms and the surrounding environmental conditions. Firms can 
mature expertise by piecing together portions of information that they gain relying on  other internal 
units (Huber, 1991).  
 
Direct experience: internal experiential knowledge  
 
Firms acquire some of their knowledge through their own first hand, direct experience (Huber, 
1991). This is usually the outcome of the operating in the market, where people apprehend  from the 
results of past decisions and apply the learnt lesson to current situations. Researchers are used to 
recognize as  the most prevailing direct learning processes the following: trial and error, defined as 
the process by which firm undertakes course of action and the consequences lead to change in the 
firm’s knowledge base (Greve, 2003); experimental learning that takes place in controlled situations 
that organizations use to test casual propositions in order to create new knowledge; improvisational 
learning, defined as real-time learning process, during which a firm learns how to resolve 
unexpected problems.  
 
 
Indirect experience: external experiential knowledge  
 
Indirect experience is referred a needed knowledge that has not been learned through a direct 
approach.  The most accepted indirect learning process is the vicarious learning (Srinivasan et al., 
2007). It is a process through which a firm apprehends from other firms’ experience rather than 
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form its own experience, which generally is verified  when firms change their behaviours as a 
consequence of the competitor’s actions. The learning from the experience of others takes place 
observing them in networks, or through licensing, strategic alliances (Huber, 1991; Welch & 
Welch, 1996). The case we analyse in this study is vicarious learning through licensing.  
After having considered each of the types of knowledge in turn, we focus our attention on the 
learning process that derives from indirect experiential knowledge. As already stated, in the present 
study, we analyse the inward licensing phenomenon recognized as a kind of vicarious learning and 
then, of indirect learning (Fletcher and Harris, 2012). Our final aim is to investigate whether the 
learning sequences, and more specifically, whether the timing at which a firm starts learn indirectly 
through a licensing agreement, have an impact on innovation performance.  
 
Licensing-In  And Innovation  
Despite the evidence that licensing is one of the main mechanism for the acquisition of knowledge 
externally developed, the literature on markets for technology focuses almost exclusively on the 
incentives and rationales that foster an firm to decide to trade its technologies (Gans & Stern, 2003, 
Teece, 1986). Although the determinants and motives of trade through a licensing agreement are 
certainly relevant, understanding the link between licensing and firm innovation is equally 
fundamental. In fact, it is surprising that only a few empirical studies have considered licensing-in 
within the context of firm innovation (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & 
Reichstein, 2012). These studies have pointed out that through licensing deals firms can speed the 
invention process (Leone & Reichstein, 2012) and augment the licensee’s capacity of being 
innovative (Rigby and Zook, 2002), by reducing invention time.  
Consistent with these arguments, Markman and colleagues (2006) propose that the tension for make  
innovation development faster may be a driving force that justify the  firms’ increasing use of 
technology in-licensing, given that it is pivotal for firms to have at disposal the capabilities and all 
the require set of resources necessary to introduce innovations at a rapid rate.  
Despite those arguments suggest that licensing-in can be recognized as a tool for feed licensee’s 
innovative abilities, the relation between licensing-in and innovation outcome has been ignored 
within the context of new ventures. In fact, it is surprising considering how much important is for a 
new venture to introduce new products or new services. Since inward licensing has been recognized 
by scholars (Fletcher and Harris, 2012) as one of the main tool through which a new venture learns 
indirectly and we investigate the new venture’s innovation rate according to the timing at which it 
learns indirectly relying on a licensing-in strategy, we also fill the gap of the missing link between a 
new venture licensee and its innovative capabilities.  
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HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
We aim at investigating the innovative outcomes of two alternative initial learning patterns, 
respectively  direct-indirect and indirect-direct. We consider as main difference between these two 
learning sequences, the age at which a new venture decides to learn indirectly: first, those firms that 
choose to rely on indirect learning in first two years of existence and second, those firms that decide 
to postpone the decision to learn indirectly some years after the beginning of their operations.  In 
order to achieve our purpose, we chose to study entrepreneurial firms because their small size 
simplifies the observation of learning process. In addition, studying entrepreneurial firms means 
trace the firms from the inception, gaining more transparent information about the development of 
learning dynamics. Moreover, according to some research, indirect learning may be an important 
initial learning process for new ventures (Bingham et al., 2012). Research shows that indirect 
learning is expressly helpful in new industries and when uncertainty is high. A different stream of  
research suggests that indirect learning may not be the right initial learning process because new 
ventures are inexperienced and suffer from lack the “absorptive capacity” to apprehend and exploit 
efficiently what learnt from others. Consequently, even if new ventures are able to obtain external 
knowledge, they may not be able to integrate and leverage on it (Zahra & George, 2002). The 
present study tries to shed light on this controversial trade-off.  
The main characteristic of an indirect learning approach based on an inward licensing strategy is the 
fact that it entails the integration of a new technology into a firm’s current knowledge base. 
Integrating a new technology can also be challenging for the licensee. Indeed, the process of 
knowledge transfer and incorporation is directly dependent on the organizational capabilities and 
resources that the acquiring firm possesses to tap into external knowledge sources (Grant, 1996; 
Van Den Bosch, Volberda, & De Boer, 1999). Therefore, we also focus on organizational factors 
related to resource availability and firms’ capacity to drawn on external knowledge to explain cross-
firm differences in benefiting from licensing-in and consequently from indirect learning.  
Therefore, existing routines, capabilities, resources, competencies are important elements for 
organizational learning process, but the conventional literature on new ventures posits that their 
distinctive characteristics are the lack of all these elements necessary to learn indirectly, in 
particular in their first years of life. Therefore, we suggest that it is more convenient for a new 
venture to focus on direct learning in early stages of their lives and then, once built all the internal 
specific-resources, rely on indirect learning approach.  
The rationales that underline this assumption are several.  
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By relying  on an indirect learning processes in early stage of a firm’s development, the main risk  
is to underestimate the development of internal capabilities. This aspect is particularly risky and 
unsafe for the long-term performance implications, because the firm’s skills for internal 
development has a large scale positive effect on its capacity to assimilate and transform external 
knowledge and information into new products, processes or services (Caloghirou 2004; Weigelt, 
2009). Although indirect learning processes may provide access to a new technology, such access 
reduces a firm’s learning by doing, a firm’s internal development and investment in the deployment 
of inward and specific capabilities and resources.  
Learning by doing to develop integrative capabilities is an iterative process of successive trials that 
occur as the firm experiments with a new technology, responds to updates of the technology, and 
discerns its best uses depending on the technology’s interactions with its business processes. 
Moreover, capabilities evolve through not only learning by doing, but also planned investment in 
inward processes (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and consequently in direct learning, that facilitates the 
building of know-how through a shared understanding around a new technology. According to 
organizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991), a firm’s fixed technological 
knowledge can improve its level of absorptive capacity. This increase in capacity enables a firm to 
evaluate and utilize other firms’ technologies, and in turn to enhance its technological knowledge. 
Thus, if a firm lacks a sufficiently developed technology base, it will likely have difficulty 
absorbing many external technologies and, consequently, it will have difficulty in learning through 
an indirect approach. As we stated before, in this study we consider the external knowledge 
acquisition strategy as a channel of indirect learning and among the tools through which a firm can 
acquire knowledge externally developed, we choose the inward licensing.  
Prior research suggests that in-house research and development investment is an important step in 
developing technological capability and improving a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). This investment strengthens the accumulation of dynamic capabilities (Helfat, 
1997) and enhances the effectiveness of external technology acquisition on innovative activities 
(Gambardella, 1992; Mowery et al., 1996), and consequently the efficacy of indirect learning.  
Although a firm during its indirect learning paths will gain some knowledge about the external 
sources on which it is relying, most learning that takes place about these activities will be indirect 
and incomplete (Zollo and Singh, 2002). The partial learning from external knowledge acquisition 
can create causal ambiguity about factors that led to the success or failure of the acquired external 
sources.  
In addition to this reasoning, we have to take into account that the new ventures are characterized 
by experiential constraints and these constraints make even more difficult the success of initial 
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indirect learning. The knowledge based view states that knowledge evolves within the firm from 
experiential learning. "Firms are described as routine-based and history-dependent systems that 
adapt incrementally to past experiences”(March, 1988), but , by definition, new ventures has no 
past experience. Consequently, this research highlights the idea that experiential biases may limit 
the potential benefits of indirect learning for firms that decide to rely on this approach in their first 
years of life. When firms decide to postpone the timing of indirect learning, they have more chances 
to gain some experience from direct learning.  
In sum, relying on indirect learning in the first two years of existence, reduces a firm’s learning by 
doing and investment in integrative capabilities. A firm that postpones the indirect learning in 
subsequent years from its inception, has more chances to establish initial operations by developing 
and bundling  its own  resources  and  its own capabilities , accumulating them from the first year. It 
allows them to integrate and assimilate better the technological asset externally acquired.  
Indirect learning is easy and efficient. But, because the knowledge generated through indirect 
learning is built on raw and weak causal links drawn from others’ observable actions, it is of lower 
quality and so less likely to limit the future possibility of mistakes. 
Yet because indirect learning often consists of making weak coincidental deducing for effective 
actions built on second- hand observations of others’ behaviours (Kim & Miner, 2007), it can result 
in incomplete and inaccurate comprehension that conduct to lower performance. This hurdle could 
be overcome postponing the decision of learning indirectly.  
Given that indirect learnt technologies can be difficult to assimilate and integrate, it is not 
uncommon that the acquiring firm needs to invest significant efforts and resources in order to 
benefit from it (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2012; Kotha et al., 2013).  
We suggest that a new venture needs time to gain the sufficient amount of resources and capabilities 
to exploit the benefits of an inward licensing strategy and consequently of an indirect learning 
approach.  
Therefore, we can state that:  
 
Hy1.  Late indirect learners are more innovative than early indirect learners  
 
The starting point of the learning process in a new venture is mainly shaped on individual learning, 
based on the founder’s prior experiences (Voudouris  et al., 2011). Coupled with entrepreneurial 
learning is the notion of organizational learning (Dutta and Crossan, 2005). Zhang et al. (2006) 
investigate how individual entrepreneurial learning may be associated with organizational learning. 
The authors attempt to provide an integrated conceptual framework of an organization learning 
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process in small firms. They acknowledge that ‘learning in small firms can only be understood in 
terms of the organizational context and the influential role of the owners/managers as they attempt 
to embed their entrepreneurial learning within the organization that they manage’ (Zhang et al., 
2006: 305). Viewed in this light, we incorporate the entrepreneurial learning as factor affecting 
organizational learning.  
Indirect learning, exposure to external technology sources through licensing, may fuel 
organizational learning (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). However, organizational learning is 
positively related to knowledge stock (Griliches, 1979); thus, learning from indirect patterns may 
contribute less to knowledge accumulation for firms with limited prior knowledge. This suggests 
that organizations need a certain level of technological knowledge before they can benefit from 
technologies discovered by other firms. In other words, organizations need a certain level of  
articulated knowledge base before they can benefit from indirect learning. For a new venture, its 
prior knowledge corresponds to its founder’s knowledge and founder’s experience. In an indirect 
learning process, implemented in the acquisition of externally developed knowledge through a 
licensing agreement, the ability to judge the technical merit of the technology or innovation often 
draws upon a very different set of expertise from that required to judge its applicability to a 
particular end use. Understanding how the technology can be best used requires not just only the 
technical expertise, but also management skills and industry expertise. In this sense, the founder’s 
role is fundamental.  
Moreover, the role played by entrepreneurial experience is relevant in particular in order to augment  
the level of absorptive capacity of the new venture. Namely, current stocks of knowledge promote 
the bundling and conversion of new knowledge, frame a firm’s ability to comprehend and apply the 
new acquired information, and define its reactions to new contexts, to reduce the  casual ambiguity 
about the factors that lead to a superior performance and to overcome the experiential constraints a 
new venture suffers from.  
We investigate two sources of entrepreneurial experience related to prior knowledge: industry 
experience and startup experience.   
Crafting an adequate and concrete business strategy that works in concert with an indirect learning 
process, requires a founder with a deep knowledge of the industry, the market, the behavior of 
incumbents, and the relevant technologies. Experience in similar settings reduces the number of 
unknowns and assumptions an entrepreneur must make when evaluating their prospects and 
consequently it reduces the degree of uncertainty. Founders with prior entrepreneurial experience in 
an industry are the most likely to know an industry’s established players and how those players are 
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likely to respond to a startup’s introduction of new products or processes. Firms founded by 
experienced industry entrepreneurs have more opportunities to exploit a match between what the 
new firm needs and what knowledge and resources the founder already knows. The closer the 
experience to the task at hand, the more likely the entrepreneur will be able to apply knowledge 
from this experience to the evaluation and operation of the new business.  
To sum up, we expect founders  with high level of industry with startup experience are more likely 
to understand the right moment in which start learning indirect, relying on positions and strategies 
of competitors and position their own products and services accordingly. These arguments lead us 
to hypothesize that industry experience positively moderates the main relation between timing at 
which starts learn indirectly and innovation performance. On the contrary, we expect that the 
founder’s startup experience is negatively associated with the main relation. The rationales 
underline the latter assumption are the following. The benefits accruing from prior start-up 
experience in decision making may be limited in entrepreneurship for the substantial variability 
across entrepreneurial tasks. Exposure to new business activities does not automatically result in 
knowledge that can be reapplied to other new businesses (Reuber and Fischer, 1994). Much of the 
knowledge that an entrepreneur can accumulate, it is so specific to the new business that he is 
examining, to that business, to its circumstances and environment (Cassar, 2009), that it may not be 
useful if this particular experience is not similar to the one the entrepreneur is planning to start. 
Given the peculiarity of each new business, it is unclear to what extent previous new business 
experience can be transported to the evaluation of other new business opportunities. 
 
Therefore, we state that: 
 
Hy2. The positive effect of late indirect learners on innovation will be positively moderated by the 
founder’s industry experience  
  
Hy3. The positive effect of late indirect learners on innovation will be negatively moderated by the 
founder’s startup experience  
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the empirical setting and data, the variables and measures used in the analysis, 
and the econometric technique employed. 
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Data and sample characteristics 
To demonstrate our hypotheses, we draw data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS). The KFS is a  
panel study of the early years of operation of 4928 firms that began operations in 2004 and this 
panel has been created by using a random sample of new businesses. KFS is the biggest study of the 
founding of new businesses to date that tracks firms over a long period of time. The 2005 baseline 
survey of KFS identified a random sample of Dunn & Bradstreet‘s Database of approximately 
250,000 businesses started in the U.S. in 2004. The survey was created using sampling weights 
based on the entire population of new businesses in the United States, with a predetermined 
oversampling of high-tech firms. The KFS identified 4,928 firms that started in 2004 and surveys 
them annually (presently, there are seven follow-up surveys). We use the confidential KFS dataset, 
which is available to researchers via remote access provided by the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC). This confidential dataset provides greater detail than the publicly available dataset 
on entrepreneur characteristics, new firm performance and operating environment, such as location 
and industry. 
The KFS public and enclave data are particularly well-suited to our study for several reasons. First, 
the database identifies entrepreneurial actions at firm inception, allowing us to study ventures as 
soon as they are created by controlling for prior histories. It also records resource acquisitions over 
time which is crucial to our theory. Second, since all the firms in the sample are created in 2004 and 
tracked on the same dimensions over seven years; we are able to control for period and cohort 
effects. Third, the sample is composed by firms which are tracked from the date of their birth to the 
age of eight years old, allowing us to follow the behaviors of those firms that engaged themselves in 
an inward licensing activities early in their existence or later on. Fourth, the data cover a wide range 
of industries, allowing us to estimate the effects of inward licensing in both high- and low-tech 
industries. Fifth, it is introduced a difference among inward licensing of patents, copyright and 
trademark. Sixth, following each new ventures from the foundation year, we could highlight the 
importance of the first resource choice made by entrepreneurs and focus attention on the order of 
resource acquisition choices as an important determinant of venture success. A limitation of relying 
on this database is the few information we have about the structure of licensing agreement. 
To gain in-depth understanding of whether is better to start learning with a direct-indirect sequence 
or an indirect-direct sequence, we create a sample composed by 276 new ventures. Among them, 
140 follow the indirect-direct path, whereas 136 learn according to the direct-indirect path. The 
main difference between the two groups is the timing at which they decide to be a licensee and start 
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learning indirectly. The direct- indirect “followers” choose to rely on external learning some years 
after their founding and they are label as “late indirect learners”; while the indirect-direct 
“followers” implement a strategy according to which the inward licensing is undertaken at inception 
and they are labelled as “early indirect learners”.  
 
MEASURES  
Independent Variable 
In order to test our hypotheses, we focus on entrepreneurial firms because they may allow for 
greater transparency of learning, better understanding of the existence, causes and consequences of 
learning sequences in older firms is also needed.  
We created a cohort of new established firm. The correspondent variable takes value 0 if the firms  
rely on indirect learning in their first two years of existence and 1 if the firms decide to start 
learning indirectly in the third and fourth year of their lives. Firms that take value 0 are recognized 
as “early indirect learners”, while firms that take value 1 are recognized as “late indirect learners”.  
In this study, we assume as channel to learn indirectly the reliance on external knowledge 
acquisition and, more specifically, through a licensing agreement.  
Therefore, licensing-in activities are provided in the form of binary information and measured in the 
KFS database as a dummy variable. The question asked to newly established firms “early indirect 
learners”: “In calendar year 2004 and 2005, did [NAME BUSINESS] license in any patents?”  . 
Same question, but for years 2006 and 2007 is asked to the late indirect learners.  
The independent variable is labelled as ind_learn.  
 
 
Dependent Variable  
In the first hypothesis, we would like to test the impact of the learning sequences on innovative 
performance. In particular, we would like to test if late indirect learners are more innovative than 
early indirect learners.  
Measures such as R&D inputs, patent counts, patent citations, or counts of new products have been 
used in trying to capture innovative performance of companies (Hagedoorn et al., 1993).  
We measure firm innovation as raw count of patents.  Given that firms might need more than one 
period to assimilate and apply the licensed technology to the generation of innovations (Leone & 
Reichstein, 2012), we use patent for the last 4 years of observations. The dependent variable, 
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labelled as Patents, is the sum of the patents  introduced by the cohort of  new ventures from 2008 
to 2011. The variable Patents  is  created as a total number of patents businesses possessed at the 
time of each interview, from 2008 to 2011. The variable is constructed using data from two 
questions: 1) dummy measure, “Does the business have any patents?”  2) a continuous measure: 
“How many patents does the business have?” 
There are a number of potential limitations to using patent data to study innovation. First, patents 
are partial measure of the production and exchange of organization knowledge. For instance, they 
do not always include tacit knowledge such as organizational routines. Another potential downside 
in the use of patent data is that all technological innovations may not be patented. 
Surely, the majority of studies, in economics literature, recognizes raw patent counts as one of the 
most adequate indicators that allow researchers to compare the discrepancies in innovative 
performance (Cantwell and Hodson, 1991, Freeman and Soete, 1997, Griliches, 1998).  
 
Even authors who are somewhat critical of the overall use of patents as a performance indicator, 
such as Mansfield (1986), admit that patents can be an appropriate indicator in the context of many 
high-tech sectors. The data from the Kauffman Firm Foundation  are oversampled for high-tech 
industries.  
 
 
Scholars in entrepreneurship have highlighted the value of patent data in analyzing the dynamics of 
innovation. Starting from the pioneering work by Schmookler (1966) and Scherer (1984), patent 
data have been usually used by  researchers as parameter to guide the process of innovation and to 
evaluate its relationship to technological and economic enrichment. Therefore, empirically, we 
consider exclusively patent license agreements because they are tools through which promulgate 
knowledge  (Shapiro, 1985), thereby ensuring a transfer of  knowledge between the parts involved 
in the licensing agreement, from the licensor to the licensee. In addition to their ability to facilitate 
technology licensing (Gallini and Winter, 1985), patents are characterized by high levels of 
knowledge codification, ‘which makes technology transfer easier and faster (David and Olsen, 
1992), and makes the knowledge potentially more accessible to the recipient firms’ (Leone et al., 
2012:970).  
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Moderator Variable 
Since the entrepreneurship process is characterized by high levels of uncertainty, which can be 
overcame by a deep understanding of competitors and industry structure, one might expect the 
success or failure of an entrepreneurial firm performance to be strongly linked to a founder’s stock 
of knowledge and experience. For a new venture, its prior knowledge corresponds to its founder’s 
knowledge and founder’s experience. The role of entrepreneurial experience is important in order to 
increase the absorptive capacity of the new venture. Current stocks of knowledge make easy the 
conversion and integration of new knowledge, delimit a firm’s ability to comprehend and put new 
information into practice, and mold its reactions to new conditions, to limit the casual ambiguity 
about the factors that lead to a superior performance and to overcome the experiential constraints a 
new venture suffers from. 
 
In order to test the interaction effect of entrepreneurial experience we created  two variables: 1) 
industry experience,  number of years of  experience the owner has in the same industry in which 
the firm competes, Industry_exp and 2) startup experience,  the number of  new businesses 
established by the founder to create our moderator variable, labeled as Startup_exp. The question 
related to the industry experience is the following: “How many years of work experience (have/has) 
(you/[OWNER B-J]) had in this industry—the one in which [NAME BUSINESS] competes?. The 
question related to the startup experience is the following: “How many other new businesses 
(have/has) (you/[OWNER B-J]) started besides [NAME BUSINESS]?” These two variables are 
measured for the whole period we are analyzing, from 2004 to 2011.  
 
 
Control Variable  
In each of our model specification we control for the matched variables: 
Firm size measured as the sum of employees (Num_Emp), and as number of owners 
(Num_Owners). 
These two variables are created taking into account the 8 years over which data are at disposal, from 
2004, year of founding, to 2011, last year of survey. The focus on size is interesting because on one 
hand, studies suggest that larger firms have greater opportunities to exploit scale economies and 
superior organizational resources (Kogut and Zander, 1993), on the other hand, learning studies in 
organizational theory suggests that a firm’s motivation to source external knowledge, and therefore, 
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learn following an indirect approach, decreases with size (Almeida et al., 2003). The question 
related to the firm size, repeated for each year, is the following: “Not counting owner(s), on 
December 31, 2004, how many people worked for [NAME BUSINESS]?”  For the measurement of 
owners, the question, repeated for each year, is: As of December 31, 2004, how many individuals or 
entities owned [NAME BUSINESS]? 
Industries controls. We use 2 digit NAICS code to identify the sector in which new ventures 
operate (Industry). Because of the analytic interest showed by KFF of the high technology 
businesses, the KFF oversamples these businesses. We use 2 digit NAICS code to identify the 
sector in which new ventures operate (INDUSTRY). We created 7 categories according to the 
definitions of each industry  provided  by  Naics: 1) utilities and construction; 2) manufacturing; 3) 
trade; 4) transportation and warehousing; 5) business support services: 6) social services; 7) other. 
Industry’s specific technical conditions as well as industry’s demand are important predictors of 
firm’s ability to innovate. 
 
Firm Origin. We control for some descriptions of how a business can get started (Origin) 
According to the way in which new ventures are founded, they differ in their ability to gain and 
assemble resources in building unique organizational capabilities that can result in differences in 
their performance (Zahra, 1996) and in their knowledge bases.  
The question related to the way in which a new venture has been established entails descriptions of 
how the new venture can get started. It is a discrete variable in a numeric format. Specifically, the 
question related is: “Which of the following best describes how [NAME BUSINESS] was started. 
Was it 
1) A new business, branch or subsidiary owned by an existing business 
2) A business inherited from someone else 
3)  A new, independent business created by a single person or a team of people 
4) The purchase of an existing business 
5) The purchase of a franchise 
6) An organization designed for social and charitable objectives and legally established as 
“not-for-profit” 
7)  the business started some other way? (SPECIFY)”  
Due to the nature of the question strictly related to the way in which the new born firm has been 
established, it has been asked only in the founding years, 2004.  
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Research and Development. We measure R&D intensity as expenditures in research and 
development (R&D). We consider this dummy variable for the whole period of time we are 
investigating, from 2004 to 2011.  
To enhance its organizational learning capability, a new venture has to dedicate investments and 
resources on its internal efforts to create new knowledge and encourage the use of external 
knowledge sources . Thus, the broader the internal capabilities of the firm, the stronger the effects 
of  different external knowledge acquisition tools on innovation performance. 
The question related to the R&D activities, asked for all 8 years of observations, is: “Did [NAME 
BUSINESS] spend any money on research and development of new products and services during 
calendar year 2004?”  
 
STATISTICAL METHODS 
Given that we measure firm innovation performance using the sum of  patents introduced in the last 
four years of observation (2008-2011), the model used to conduct the empirical analysis had to 
appropriately accommodate non-negative integer count values. Moreover, prior works have 
indicated that modeling patent count implies using a regression approach that has to deal with many 
zeros (Ziedonis, 2004). We start our analysis considering first to use a Poisson model as it is one of 
the simplest alternatives to deal with count data (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). However, the 
Poisson distribution relies on the main assumption that the variance is proportional to the mean, 
           . If this assumption is violated, the coefficients will be estimated consistently, but 
underestimated standard errors might be reflected in counterfeit significance levels (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 1986; Gourieroux, Monfort, & Trognon, 1984). The test for overdispersion provided 
evidence against using a Poisson model and in favor of a model that allows the variance of the 
dependent variable to exceed its mean.  
The usual alternative to the pure Poisson model is the conditional Negative Binomial specification 
(Hausman et al., 1984). It is acknowledged  as the general version of the of Poisson regression, as it 
has the same mean structure as Poisson regression and it has an extra parameter to model the over-
dispersion. Negative Binomial is appropriate under conditions of overdispersion. 
In our case, the data are over- dispersed: the mean (2.7) is not close to the variance (218.5). The 
inappropriateness of Poisson model is also witnessed by the poisgof command, which tests the 
Poisson goodness-of-fit: a significant (p<0.05) t-test statistic from the gof indicates that the Poisson 
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model is inappropriate. In our case, the gof test is significant (p-value=0.000). Therefore, we are 
inclined to use the Negative binomial model. We run the analysis one more time, this time using 
negative binomial regression. The likelihood ratio test in the negative binomial regression controls 
for the overdispersion. When the indicator of overdispersion is zero, the negative binomial 
distribution is analogous to a Poisson distribution. In our case, alpha is significantly different from 
zero and thus sustains one more time that the negative binomial model is the most appropriate 
method.  
In conclusion, as indicated by econometric tests, run to check for the most appropriate model 
between Poisson and negative binomial distribution, we use the negative binomial model in order to 
validate our hypotheses.  
RESULTS  
Table 2.3.1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. It  presents 
the descriptive statistics for the explanatory, control and moderator variables. Specifically, in Table 
2.3.1., the mean and the standard deviations, the minimum and the maximum values of each 
variable included in the regression analysis, are presented.   
 
[Insert TABLE 2.3.1. here] 
 
Since our main relation investigates the effect of timing at which a new venture starts learning 
indirectly on innovation performance, measured as number of patents, we test some additional 
descriptive analysis. Our hypothesis about the positive impact of late indirect on innovation 
performance is confirmed by these preliminary analysis. The difference in the number of patents 
introduced by the two groups of firms is statistically significant. As showed by t-test (p.value= 
0.000), the mean of patents introduced by late indirect learning is 4.6, while the mean of patents 
introduced by early indirect learning is 0.74.  
 
 
We compute the correlation matrix, generating correlation coefficients and p-values, placing an 
asterisk (*) only when the p-value is .05 or lower. The correlation between any variable and itself is 
always 1. The correlation coefficient can range from -1 to +1, with -1 indicating a perfect negative 
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correlation, + 1 indicating a perfect positive correlation, and 0 indicating no correlation at all. 
Correlation measures the strength and the direction of the linear relationship between the two 
variables. If it is positive and significant means that as one variable unit increases, so does the other. 
 
 
Table 2.3.2. reports the results of the negative binomial model for the dependent variable, patents. 
To test our three hypotheses, we used hierarchical regression analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2.3.2 here] 
 
Model (1) represents the main effects model, control variables plus the main explanatory variable, 
licensing-in at inception or soon after the founding year. In the second model (Model 2), we include 
the moderator variable, the industry experience, and in the third model (Model 3), we include the 
interaction term Industry Experience * Timing at indirect learning. In the fourth model (Model 4), 
we add the second moderator variable, Startup Experience, and  in the subsequent model (Model 5), 
we test the joint effect of the startup experience and timing at indirect learning  (Startup Experience 
* Timing at indirect learning) on the main relation between innovative capability and being early or 
late indirect learners.  
The results provided support for Hypothesis 1, which stated that engaging in a licensing agreement 
as licensee soon after the founding year will be positively related to firm’s subsequent capacity to 
produce innovations. The reported coefficients for Lic-In, the explanatory variable, are positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) across all the models. It is possible to observe an increase in their 
magnitude from Model 1 to Model 5. We interpret this results stating that firms engaged in an 
inward licensing agreement after their founding years are more innovative than the counterparts that 
opt for the licensing strategy in their first stage of development.  
 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that the main relation is positively moderated by the founder’s industry 
experience. Counterintuitively, the second hypothesis is not supported. The positive effect of being 
a late indirect learning  on firm patenting is not augmented in conditions of high level of founder’s 
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industry experience, indicated by the number of years of experience the owner has in the same 
industry in which the firm competes. The reported coefficient for the interaction term, industry 
experience * ind_Learn is negative and significant (p<0.001). Additionally, we used a Wald test to 
verify whether the combined effect of this interaction term and Ind_learn are simultaneously equal 
to zero, which would suggest that removing the interaction term would not significantly reduce the 
model fit. The result for the dependent variable rejected the null hypothesis that both terms are 
simultaneously equal to zero (chi2 (2)=53.14, p<0.000).  
Finally, the results supported the moderation effect predicted in Hypothesis 3 regarding the fact that 
the effect of  the timing at which a new venture starts learning indirectly on innovation performance 
will be moderated by the founder’s startup experience, in such  a fashion that increasing the number 
of business established by the founder will weaken the positive effect of late licensing on the firm’s 
subsequent capacity to produce innovations.  Accordingly, the interaction term between startup 
experience and Ind_Learn produced statistically significant and negative coefficient (p<0.000). This 
finding supports the idea that startup experience negatively moderates the relationship between late 
indirect learners and firm innovation. We also used the Wald test to check whether the joint effect 
of Startup Experience *Ind_Learn and the main variable is statistically different from zero. The 
results also indicated that the inclusion of the interaction term creates a statistically significant 
improvement in the fit of the model for the dependent variable (chi2(2)=62.83, p<0.000) 
In sum, the overall results support the idea that both type of founder’s experience, industry and 
startup experience, are important moderators for firms’ capacity to produce innovations out of 
timing at which firms decide to start learning following an indirect pattern, though a licensing 
agreement. The counterintuitive result regards the moderation of industry experience that is a 
negative moderation, opposite to what we hypothesized. 
Briefly, the final results do not support the idea that the higher number of years, the founder has 
accumulated in the same industry in which the new venture operates, is a measure that positively 
moderates the relations between the timing at which the indirect learning starts and the firms’ 
capacity to produce innovations. The results suggest that the main relation, namely the positive 
correlation between late indirect learners and patenting activities, is negatively moderated by the 
experience gained by the founder in the same industry in which the firm is operating, with 
increasing number of years  industry experience  leading to a decrease in the positive effect of late 
indirect learning, through a licensing agreement, on patenting.  
[Insert Figure 2.3.3 here] 
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On the other hand, the graph, reported in Figure 2.3.4,  shows that  increasing number of start- up 
held by the founder lead to a decrease in the positive effect of late indirect learning, through 
licensing-in, on firm's innovation abilities. That is to say, the effect of  the timing at which a new 
venture starts learning indirectly on innovation performance will be negatively moderated by the 
founder’s startup experience, in such  a fashion that a growing number of business established by 
the founder will reduce the positive impact of late indirect learners on the firm’s subsequent 
capacity to produce innovations. To demonstrate the breadth  of the interaction effect, Figure 2.3.4  
depicts the plot of the interaction regarding Start-up Experience with Ind_Learn (Age at which the 
new venture starts learning indirectly). The graphic representation of the interaction effect is 
consistent with the results in model 5 reported on table 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.3.4 here] 
 
 
The examination of the control variables reveals that Size had significant and positive effects on 
firm patenting. The rationales underpinning the importance of the size are larger firms have (a) 
more chances to access knowledge outside the firm’s boundaries because of the higher number of 
links to the external environment as well as (b) more occasions to insert this new knowledge into 
the internal and current knowledge base due to the wider array of activities ongoing in the firm. 
Given the greater scale and scope of activities of larger new ventures, they exploit an higher number 
of opportunities not just to attain, but also to make an efficient use of the indirect learnt knowledge 
in their innovative activities. Thus, even if small and large firms have the same number of external 
relationships, larger firms are more likely to benefit from knowledge indirect learnt, since they can 
apply this knowledge across a greater number of activities. To fully exploit the opportunities given 
by indirect learning, new ventures must depend on their organizational and managerial resources 
and capabilities. Furthermore, firms must have the ability to combine existing knowledge with new 
knowledge indirectly gained. The nature of indirect knowledge may require that several sub-units 
interact actively across extended periods of time to build new products or processes (Sakakibara and 
Westney, 1992). To facilitate this knowledge building process, new ventures must establish intra-
organizational mechanisms, processes and systems to link various sub-units across time (Almeida et 
al., 1998). Thus, the complex tasks of learning following an indirect approach, based on the inward 
licensing strategy, require the possession of significant managerial and organizational resources and 
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capabilities. Larger new ventures are more likely to possess these resources to meet the challenge of 
learning indirectly. 
Also R&D displays a significant and positive impact on firm innovation performance. The 
increasing level of R&D allows the firm to absorb quickly and in a better way the knowledge 
acquired indirectly through the licensing agreement. In addition to that, Origin, the description of 
the way in which the new venture got started, also displays a positive and significant coefficient. 
The origin lead to variations in firm’s goals, resources, and capabilities and, above all in the firms’ 
knowledge base. For example, a new venture created as a new, independent business has a lower 
level of resources, a not well developed skills and capabilities structure compared to a new venture 
born as a purchase of an existing business. The successful conversion and integration of licensed-in 
technologies will imply an effort for the licensee, that consists in allocating significant amount of 
resources in the exploitation of the newly acquired technology. Consequently, unabsorbed resources 
at the time that a technology has been acquired can be necessary for the licensee to be able to deal 
with integration challenges.  
For what regard the industry in which the new ventures operate, it is important to notice that there is 
no difference between the two groups of firms. The majority of them operate in the manufacturing 
industry, followed by Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services. The licensee’s difficulties in 
integrating a newly licensed-in technology increase if the licensor and the licensee operate in 
different industries or at different activities of the value chain (Wilcox King & Zeithaml, 2003). 
This can be attributed to the fact that in most cases, a technology has been developed to be applied 
and to meet the needs of a firm in a specific context (Gambardella & Giarratana, 2012). 
 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
We performed some  additional robustness checks to validate whether our main results are receptive 
to alternative methods. Previous studies have demonstrated that patents are mainly related not only  
with new product introductions but also with non-patentable innovations (Trajtenberg, 1987). 
Therefore, since the literature has suggested several ways to control for the extent of firm’s 
innovation performance, we choose to validate our results changing the dependent variable. We 
control for the introduction of new product and of product new to market. The literal question 
related to these two measures are respectively: “ During calendar year 2010 and 2011, did (Business 
name) introduce any products or services that were new or significantly improved?” and “ During 
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calendar year 2010 and 2011, were any products or services new to any market or markets (Name 
Business) competes in?”  
As reported by the previous questions, the data at our disposal about the introduction of new 
products or new services are available only for the last years (2010 and 2011) of observations. Since 
we are dealing with a dummy variables, we use both the probit and the logit model to test whether 
the late indirect learners are still better at innovation performance, even if we take into 
consideration a new dependent variable.  
The results show that the late indirect learners introduce higher number of products or services, that 
are new to the markets in which they compete, than early indirect learners. The coefficient that test 
the impact of late indirect learners on introduction of  products or services  in 2009 is positive and 
significant (p<0.000) and the same condition is verified for year 2010 (p<0.03). The coefficient that 
test the impact of late indirect learners on introduction of products or services new to the market in 
which the firm competes  in 2009 is positive and significant (p<0.05) and the same condition is 
verified for year 2010 (p<0.00).  
We check also for a different cut off in time. Since our main assumption in developing our 
hypothesis is that the late indirect learners are better performing in innovation because are better 
equipped with firm-specific resources, had more time to establish internal routines and 
competencies that allow them to exploit the benefits deriving from external knowledge acquired 
through a licensing agreement, we  compare the firms that start learn indirectly in the first two years 
of experience with the firms that star learning indirectly very late, in the fourth and fifth years of 
life.  Our main results are confirmed by the new analysis:  the results show that (very) late indirect 
learners are more innovative than early indirect learners. The coefficient is positive ( 2.5) and 
significant (p<0.000). We performed a test, to be even more sure and the p-value is equal to 0.000, 
showing that the average of patents introduced by early indirect learners in 2010 and 2011 is 0.88, 
whereas the average of patents introduced by very late indirect learners in 2010 and 2011 is 2.9. 
The directions of the interactions term are also confirmed. The industry and startup experience 
negatively moderate the main and positive relation between very late indirect learners and their 
capacity to be innovative.  
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CONCLUSIONS and FUTURE RESEARCH  
Organizational learning is of considerable importance because it enables innovation, adaptation and 
enlarge its knowledge base. These elements are fundamental for the success of the indirect learning, 
meant as the reliance on external knowledge through a licensing agreement. Our study suggests that 
the innovative performance benefits associated with the learning sequences are contingent upon 
when it used. Even though scholars know much about the importance of learning and particular 
learning processes that firms use, not much attention has been paid about whether there is a better 
timing in which start to learn indirect or direct. This paper was mainly motivated by the scarcity of 
studies examining the concept of sequences in learning and their impact on innovation performance.  
The reason why the concept of sequences in the learning process is almost absent is due to the fact 
the organizational learning has a fluid development that make it difficult to isolate and analyze 
separately the phases and temporal ordering of the learning process. We try to do a first step in 
addressing this gap. We address not only how learning occurs in new ventures’ firms, but also what 
is learned and the impact of the learned content on innovation performance, measured as number of 
patents. In line with Bingham’s works (2012), we address the question of whether initial learning 
sequence patterns influence firm’s performance. Hence, while extant studies contribute by 
suggesting a range of potential learning processes (Huber, 1991; Miner et al., 2001), the present 
study contributes advancing the hypothesis that internal constraints (e.g. lack of sufficient 
development of internal capabilities) may shape the outcomes derived from the different learning 
processes. Our study is mainly focus on the consequences of the timing at which a new venture 
starts learning indirectly on its innovation capabilities.   
From our data, consistently with our expectations, the results provided broad support for the idea 
that by engaging in licensing-in deals, firms can increase their subsequent capacity to produce 
innovations. We find support for the hypothesis according to which it is more convenient for a new 
born firm to start learning indirectly in subsequent years after its inception. Operating in this way, a 
new venture can dedicate its initial effort to internal activities, to create routines and capabilities, 
specific-resources, it can rely on organizational slack  that help firm to be better equipped for the 
indirect learning approach. While the hypothesis developed around the moderator role played by 
founder’s startup experience is corroborated, the hypothesis suggesting the positive effect of 
founder’s industry  experience on innovation performance is not validated by econometric results.  
This study mainly contributes to literature in the following way. First, its main contribution is 
related to the organizational learning literature within the context of new ventures.  Our results 
challenge the “learning advantages of newness” thesis as put forward by Autio, Sapienza, and 
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Almeida (2000), and extended by Sapienza et al. (2006). In an empirical examination investigating 
international new ventures, Autio et al. (2000) argue in favour of the ‘learning advantage of 
newness’. This framework entails that the strategy of internationalization implemented in early 
developmental stages of a new venture allow the firm to experience greater entrepreneurial 
behavior, hinder learning hurdles and let the firm obtaining a growth advantage. To wit, early 
applicants for an internationalization strategy have more chances to grow up quickly than later 
entrants because of “learning advantages of newness.”  Consistent with this reasoning, Sapienza et 
al. (2005) suggest that the earlier the firm is committed in international activity, the higher the 
degree of success of its learning efforts. The deduction is that, despite the severe consequences due 
to liabilities of newness, younger firms can enjoy some learning advantages in new context that can 
foster growth. Confirming the assumptions underlying the “learning advantage of newness” concept 
for international new ventures, Kuemmerle (2002) states that as international new venture has  less 
solid  routines than older internationalized firms, they are more likely to augment their organi-
zational stock of knowledge. In line with Kuemmerle (2002), our empirical results, even if not 
applied in an international entrepreneurship framework, show that the older a new venture the faster 
in learning and developing innovation. 
Second, we contribute to the technology licensing research stream (Arora et al., 2001; Fosfuri, 
2006; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). The literature stream on the demand side of 
markets for technology has largely ignored the fact that firms can use technology licensing-in as a 
learning mechanism connected to their overall innovation strategy. This paper addressed this 
limitation by examining the effect of technology licensing-in on firm capacity to produce 
innovations and by examining the timing at which is more appropriate for a new venture to 
implement  an inward licensing strategy.  
In so doing, we also contribute to the nascent literature about the role of new ventures as acquiring 
firm involved in a licensing agreement. This last contribution is coupled with the third contribution, 
related to the link between inward licensing and innovation. Given that firms are becoming more 
open to acquiring knowledge from external sources, it is particularly relevant to understand the link 
between licensing-in and innovation. Our study suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between inward licensing and innovation under conditions of well- developed licensee’s  
knowledge base, well-structured system of internal routines, a huge amount of resources , and well-
developed internal R&D efforts.   
Finally, we contribute to the literature based on the concept of “learning by licensing”.  Considering 
the link between licensing and organizational learning, previous studies have proposed the term 
“learning-by-licensing” (Johnson, 2002) to indicate the learning possibilities that firms can access 
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when engaging in licensing agreements. According to this perspective, the acquisition of new 
knowledge results in organizational learning through an interactive combinatorial process in which 
new and existing elements are linked together through a continuous process of experimentation 
(Pisano, 1996). In this context, a licensed technology can be understood as an input that increases 
the size and diversity of the firm’s knowledge base. Accordingly, licensing-in is expected to have a 
positive impact on the number of innovations produced by the licensee.  
 
The findings in this paper also have managerial implications.  
 
To understand the role played by organizational learning within the context of new ventures, we 
start from two basic assumptions:1) new ventures are, by definition, characterized by several 
constraints, above all resource and competencies limits, 2) organizational learning is defined as the 
process whereby organizations increase their knowledge and add to their bundle of capabilities 
(Levitt and March, 1988). Therefore, organizational learning is turning into a fundamental 
instrument for new ventures to achieve and maintain a relevant advantage over competitors and 
enhance its performance. In this sense, the urgency to develop an organizational learning capability 
has become an important priority for entrepreneurs and managers.  
Moreover,  firms can use technology licensing-in as a mechanism to access external knowledge, 
which provides learning opportunities and opens up new possibilities for knowledge generation. 
However, given the challenges that are associated with knowledge acquisition, it is important for 
managers and entrepreneurs to be guided in choosing the moment at which implement an inward 
licensing strategy is a winning step. 
According to our results, managers and entrepreneurs should pay attention to not rely too much on 
the knowledge already acquired in their past experience. Each business is specific and each industry 
is characterized by singular factors. Therefore, the consequence of strong reliance on past 
experience is the creation of path dependence and the risk of implementing myopic behaviors.  
 
This study should also be considered in light of some limitations, that suggest opportunities for 
future research. More work is needed to examine learning sequences in a larger number of firms 
and a wider range of industries. It would therefore be valuable to explore how our findings 
generalize or do not with other channels of indirect learning, different from inward licensing 
mechanism, such as alliances, acquisitions. In addition, our sample consists of new born firms in 
which learning is critical to survival than it is for established and mature firms. Although a focus on 
new ventures allows for a greater level of transparency of learning dynamics, deeper comprehension 
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of the existence, determinants, rationales and consequences of learning sequences in older firms is 
needed.  
An additional limitation could be derived from the variable used as indicator of innovation 
performance. We measure the firm’s innovative capability relying on the raw count of patents, but 
other measures could be performed. For example, increasingly researchers are using patent citations 
as an indicator of inventive performance of companies. Compared to raw counts of patents, patent 
citations also include a measure of the quality of patents. The basic assumption in using this 
indicator is that there is a positive relationship between the importance of a patent and the degree to 
which a patent is cited in later patents. This information on previous patents can be traced in each 
patent application . The number of patent citations for a particular patent indicates its importance or 
impact. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Table 2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Patents 2.7 14.78 0 205 
Ind_Learn 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Num_emp 8.01 40.87 0 1100 
Num_own 4.71 12.89 0 100 
R&D 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Origin 4 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Origin 5 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Industry 2 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Industry 3 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Industry 4 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Industry 5 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Industry 6 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Industry 7 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Industry_exp  1.34 3.35 0 40 
Startup_exp 13.54 11.14 0 47 
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TABLE 2.3.2. Negative Binomial Regression 
 
 
 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV MODEL V 
Dep. Var 
Patents 
     
Ind.Var 
Ind_Learn 
0.715*** 
(0.208) 
0.716*** 
(0.225) 
2.349*** 
(0.401) 
2.324*** 
(0.407) 
2.511*** 
(0.396) 
Control-Var      
Num_Emp -0.0107 
(0.00607) 
-0.0114 
(0.00696) 
-0.00888 
(0.00806) 
-0.00875 
(0.00804) 
-0.00124 
(0.00786) 
Num_Owners 0.0403*** 
(0.0117) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0137) 
0.0595*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0588*** 
(0.0172) 
0.0671*** 
(0.0175) 
R&D 1.491*** 
(0.221) 
1.424*** 
(0.225) 
1.663*** 
(0.231) 
1.677*** 
(0.235) 
1.468*** 
(0.229) 
Year 
0. 
0 0 
 
0 0 0 
1 -0.00633 
(0.325) 
-0.00854 
(0.325) 
-0.113 
(0.320) 
-0.111 
(0.320) 
-0.218 
(0.311) 
2 -0.120 
(0.333) 
-0.113 
(0.335) 
-0.207 
(0.332) 
-0.210 
(0.332) 
-0.336 
(0.324) 
3 0.0815 
(0.352) 
0.104 
(0.356) 
0.0246 
(0.352) 
0.0256 
(0.352) 
-0.0691 
(0.345) 
4 0.150 
(0.367) 
0.139 
(0.374) 
0.0360 
(0.372) 
0.0422 
(0.373) 
-0.0215 
(0.365) 
5 0.450 
(0.379) 
0.466 
(0.387) 
0.533 
(0.392) 
0.545 
(0.394) 
0.404 
(0.384) 
6 0.380 
(0.393) 
0.435 
(0.405) 
0.352 
(0.401) 
0.355 
(0.401) 
0.256 
(0.392) 
7 0.221 
(0.419) 
0.277 
(0.431) 
0.177 
(0.426) 
0.175 
(0.436) 
0.0717 
(0.419) 
Business Origin  
 
3 
0 0 0 0 0 
4 0.229 
(0.454) 
0.228 
(0.459) 
0.740 
(0.454) 
0.721 
(0.458) 
0.321 
(0.441) 
5 5.503*** 
(0.743) 
5.418*** 
(0.742) 
5.198*** 
(0.746) 
5.201*** 
(0.746) 
4.694*** 
(0.717) 
Industry  
1  
0 0 0 0 0 
2 5.432*** 
(1.295) 
5.440*** 
(1.305) 
5.361*** 
(1.298) 
5.361*** 
(1.299) 
5.021*** 
(1.320) 
3 1.134 
(1.409) 
1.153 
(1.412) 
1.227 
(1.394) 
1.226 
(1.394) 
1.268 
(1.402) 
4 
 
-13.75 
(2539.6) 
-13.69 
(2401.7) 
-14.35 
(3006.9) 
-16.32 
(8046.9) 
-13.78 
(1991.8) 
5 4.536*** 4.551*** 4.772*** 4.770*** 4.577*** 
138 
 
(1.292) (1.298) (1.294) (1.294) (1.317) 
6 -16.19 
(537.6) 
-16.11 
(549.4) 
-16.36 
(655.3) 
-17.93 
(1434.1) 
-15.51 
(445.6) 
7 0.543 
(1.494) 
0.537 
(1.495) 
0.247 
(1.501) 
0.268 
(1.501) 
0.0749 
(1.519) 
Moderator_Var 
Industry_exp 
 -0.00309 
(0.0109) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0536*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0512*** 
(0.0151) 
Startup_Exp    -0.0113 
(0.0322) 
0.0460 
(0.0401) 
InteractionTerm 
Industry_exp*Ind_Learn 
  -0.0101*** 
(0.0109) 
-0.0102*** 
(0.0215) 
-0.0831*** 
(0.0214) 
Startup_exp*Ind_Learn     -0.580*** 
(0.112) 
_cons -5.504** 
(1.315) 
-5.448*** 
(1.321) 
-6.735*** 
(1.343) 
-6.735*** 
(1.343) 
-6.384*** 
(1.366) 
Lnalpha 
_cons 
2.246*** 
(0.0708) 
2.237*** 
(0.0719) 
2.195*** 
(0.0720) 
2.195*** 
(0.0720) 
2.128*** 
(0.0734) 
N 1143 1390 1390 1390 1390 
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Figure 2.3.3 Graphs of interaction effect: Industry Experience* Indirect Learning 
 
 
                 
Figure 2.3.4 Graphs of interaction effect: Startup Experience* Indirect Learning 
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2.4 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS  
In the last decades, licensing activities and practices have increased their weight and significance, 
operating upon the wide-ranging spreading of markets for technologies. Consistent with the Open 
Innovation Paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003), firms make increasingly use of strategic collaborations 
and rely strongly on knowledge developed outside their internal boundaries. This new approach to 
innovation presupposes the need for the organisations to be more and more dependent on “foreign” 
technologies in order  to unfasten the potential of firms’ internal activities, addressed to innovative 
outcomes. In this scenario, the firms’ likelihood to obtain and maintain over the time a competitive 
advantage is subordinated to their aptitude to identify the opportunities at hand, inside as well as 
outside their boundaries and to their predisposition to exploit them in an efficient way. In so doing, 
the firms can speed and make their innovation processes more dynamic. Licensing is recognized as 
one of the most popular tool applied by a firm in order to achieve and capitalize on the gains 
gathered from an open attitude in technology strategy choices. 
My thesis attempts at shedding light on new stimulating and compelling issues correlated to in-
licensing activities that have not been investigated by the literature on licensing and markets for 
technologies. We analyse the scenario of new ventures companies, considering them as licensee and 
studying the impacts of their decisions to be a licensee on their survival rates and innovation 
performance. While the majority of studied on licensing and markets for technology has dedicated 
its research efforts on the aspects in which the licensor is involved, the licensees’ perspective has 
been almost neglecting, leading to a weak understanding of the determinants and conditions 
affecting licensing-in practices.  
From the licensee’s standpoint, the licensing strategy is strictly related to the exploration, 
combination, conversion, adaptation, exploitation of external technologies acquired through a 
licensing agreement. Since a new venture is characterized by many shortages, it is interesting 
studying how these processes take place in the development of its technology strategy.  
General purposes of the present research project are to apprehend the innate characteristics of those 
newly established firms that are involved in a licensing deal, as licensee, and to assess the 
consequences of implementation of an inward licensing on new venture’s survival probabilities and 
innovative outcomes. Even though the factual evidences that the growth of licensing strategy has 
accelerated over the last times, as made manifest by the majority of firms implicated in a licensing 
agreement,  the licensing phenomenon within the scenario of new ventures is still an open point in 
question.  
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Therefore, the thesis would like to add insights to the inward licensing strategy in the context of 
new ventures, recognizing the common features that differentiate a licensee from a non-licensee and 
evaluating the impact of this strategy on new venture’s survival probabilities and their innovative 
performance. It is worthwhile to be mentioned that the analysis is elaborated focusing on new firm’s 
first years of existence. We know from previous work that a firm’s  founding conditions have long 
lasting repercussions on its survival and growth (Mata et al. 1995, Huynh et al. 2008, Geroski et al. 
2010). We embrace the literature that highlights the relevance of initial conditions (Bamford et al., 
1999; Aspelund et al., 2005), supporting the idea that early decisions adhere with the organization 
and engrave the firm in the long term.  
Each of the current research papers provides a manifold augmentation in order to achieve the 
general purpose of the thesis. They inquire from disparate perspectives the same phenomenon, the 
inward licensing, by undertaking distinct sides of analysis and by leveraging on heterogeneous 
frameworks of literature.  
The theoretical paper, “New Venture’s Inward Licensing: Who And What?”,  has been mainly 
motivated by the paucity of studies focusing on the demand side of markets for technology and, in 
particular, in the case in which the demand side is composed by new ventures. While much has 
been learned about intensity of licensing, its dynamics,  features and attributes, determinants and 
hurdles met by companies doing or willing to license, less has been learned about the inward 
licensing strategy in the context of new ventures. In order to fill this gap, we identify the distinctive 
characteristics that discriminate between a new venture licensee  and a new venture non-licensee. 
The most relevant breakthroughs about the features of a new venture, that decide to in-licensing a 
patent, suggest mainly that the majority of new ventures licensees comes from the manufacturing 
industry, while their counterparts come from the professional, scientific, and technical Services. 
Moreover, new ventures licensees are usually smaller than their counterparts and they are product- 
provider. In addition to these results, an higher number of new ventures licensees, compared to non-
licensees, born as a purchase of franchise. For what concerns the financing method, we find that 
licensee have constantly higher level of debt and equity. The most unexpected finding is about the 
“what” new ventures are used to in-license. Indeed, we find that the number of new ventures that in-
license copyrights and trademarks is higher than those new ventures that in-license patents.  
In the second paper, “Effect Of Inward Licensing On New Venture’s Survival”, the starting point is 
the recognition that the liabilities of newness and the liabilities of smallness force new venture to be 
strongly dependent on external sources, but the contribution of external acquisition on new born 
firm’s longevity has not been explored yet, especially in the licensing context. Comparing the 
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survival rate of  a new venture in its first years of existence, with the survival rate of a new venture 
no-licensee in its first years of existence, we find that licensee has lower probability to survive than 
its non-licensees counterparts, as consequence of higher number of years necessary for a licensee to 
reach the market until the first sales. In other words, licensees survive less than their non-licensee 
counterparts.  
In the third paper, “A Study Of The Influence Of Learning Sequences On New Venture’s 
Innovation: The Moderating Effect Of Founder’s Experience”, we shift our theoretical framework, 
putting the accents on implications of learning sequences adopted by new ventures on their 
innovative performance. Albeit scholars know much about the importance of learning and particular 
learning processes that firms use, not much attention has been paid about whether there is a better 
timing in which start to learn indirect or direct. Therefore, we mainly postulate that innovative 
performance benefits associated with the learning sequences are contingent upon when it used. 
Particularly, the timing at which a firm chooses to start learning indirectly, through a licensing 
agreement, impacts on its innovative outcomes.  
In line with our expectations, the results provided broad support for the idea that is more convenient 
for a new born firm to start learning indirectly in subsequent years after its inception.  
The thesis mainly contributes to literature in the following way. First, it adds enhancement to the 
specific stream of research on the role of inward licensing in new venture’s context, and, in 
particular, we contribute to the technology licensing research stream (Arora et al., 2001; Fosfuri, 
2006; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012), identifying the licensing-in strategy as a 
learning mechanism related to the overall firm’s innovation strategy. We explore the effect of 
technology licensing-in on firm capacity to produce innovations and by taking into account the 
timing at which is more appropriate for a new venture to implement  an inward licensing strategy.  
Second, the thesis advances the in-process discussion on the factors influencing new venture’s 
likelihood to survive. While a consistent number of articles examine the effects of human, social, 
and financial capital on the likelihood of firm’s survival, we focus on the initial technology strategy 
as reason why a new venture could stop its operations.  
Moreover, in line with Aspelund et al. (2005), we suggest  that considerable research effort should 
be focused on investigating antecedents and the consequences of those initial strategic and market 
decisions made by new firms. Indeed, the technological strategy developed initially is therefore 
likely to establish a path dependency. Therefore, as third contribution we mention the supplement to 
existing literature on the effects of new venture founding conditions.  
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Fourth, the thesis could be considered as contributor in the identification (Arora et al.,2001) of the 
factors that lead to both inefficiencies and  efficiencies in markets for technology. Therefore, the 
present study could enrich the markets for technology literature: the literature on markets for 
technology has not determined whether in-licensing is a winning strategy for new ventures. We 
show that gain access to a knowledge asset externally developed, through a licensing agreement, is 
not an adequate initial decision for a new born firm. Thus, although firms may choose to in- license 
technologies to over trough entry barriers, to exploit the newest technologies, the consequences of 
this choice for the speed to market, the survival and the innovation outcomes is not neutral.  
Fifth, another contribution is related to the organizational learning literature within the context of 
new ventures. In particular, we challenge the “learning advantages of newness” concept (Autio et 
al., 2000; Sapienza et al. 2006). While it posits that younger firms can enjoy some learning 
advantages in new context that can foster growth, we state that the older a new venture the faster in 
indirect learning. This contribution is strictly related to the next one: given that firms are becoming 
more open to acquiring knowledge from external sources, it is particularly relevant to have a deep 
comprehension of the link between licensing-in and innovation. The present research work suggests 
that there is a positive relationship between inward licensing and innovation under conditions of 
well- developed licensee’s  knowledge base, well-structured system of internal routines, a huge 
amount of resources , and well-developed internal R&D efforts.   
Finally, we participate to the literature based on the concept of “learning by licensing”.  
Considering the connection between licensing and organizational learning, prior studies have 
developed the concept of “learning-by-licensing” (Johnson, 2002) to indicate the learning 
possibilities on which a firm can rely by engaging in licensing agreements. According to this 
perspective, the procurement of new knowledge leads to higher level of organizational learning 
through a dynamic process in which new and existing elements are put together through a 
continuous process of experimentation (Pisano, 1996). In this context, a licensed technology can be 
recognized as an input that augment the size and diversity of the firm’s knowledge base. 
Accordingly, licensing-in is expected to have a positive impact on the number of innovations 
produced by the licensee.  
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